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The three chapters of this dissertation are closely related to one another and 
pertain to work flexibility. The first chapter uses an occupational choice model to 
estimate how workers value schedule flexibility in terms of other on the job 
characteristics. The second chapter also estimates how workers value flexibility using a 
hedonic wage approach. This method provides an estimate of how workers value 
schedule flexibility in terms of real wages. In the third chapter I estimate the impact of 
family structure on the probability that men choose a flexible job. 
Flexible work schedules are becoming an increasingly important characteristic for 
one's occupational choice. I examine the effect of flexible work schedules on college 
graduates’ occupational choice. Over the past 30 years flexible work schedules have 
become more prevalent in the work place to help employees balance work and family 
lives. The United States' government is advocating flexible work schedules in order to 
promote gender equality for men and women's occupational distribution. I estimate an 
occupational choice model with over 200 occupations using Census data for 1980, 1990, 
and 2000. Both men and women college graduates are attracted to jobs with flexible work 
hours, but in terms of marginal rate of substitution men are willing to sacrifice 
increasingly more safety on the job to obtain flexible schedules relative to women. 
Further, married individuals have become increasingly attracted to flexible work hours in 
terms of MRS; however, single mothers now value flexible work hours relative to safety 
less compared to 1980. 
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The hedonic wage model finds similar results to the occupational choice model. 
The results suggest that men and women value schedule flexibility differently and that 
workers in high and low skilled occupations value flexibility differently. Looking at men 
and women aggregated by occupational skill level there is little difference between the 
value men and women place on flexibility due the relatively large size of the standard 
errors on the estimated marginal willingness to pay. Women are willing to sacrifice 
approximately 1% of wages to obtain flexibility and men are willing to sacrifice 2% of 
wages.  
 The difference between men and women becomes starker when examining 
differences in occupational skill level. There is the peculiar result that men in low skilled 
occupations must be compensated to take on flexible schedules. In theory workers need 
not be compensated for schedule flexibility because if it is undesired characteristics 
workers do not to utilize the flexibility and thus would be unwilling to sacrifice wages. 
Men in high skilled occupations value schedule flexibility more than women. These 
results are consistent with the results from the occupational choice model which also 
showed that men were more willing to sacrifice physical safety on the job to obtain 
flexibility.  
Lastly, in the occupational choice model I find that married value flexibility 
relatively more compared to other demographic groups. On an intuitive level it makes 
sense that men with working spouses would be more likely to choose jobs with flexible 
schedules. Families may wish to be able to coordinate their schedules in order to better 
balance their work and personal lives. It also provides an opportunity for individuals to 
 iv 
take off from work if something unexpected arises. Family structure is an important 
determinant in the occupational choice model and how individuals value flexible 
schedules. I find that having a working spouse increases the probability of choosing a job 
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Equation Section 1GENDER, OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE, AND FLEXIBLE WORK HOURS Equation Section  1
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As women become more career oriented one would expect that balancing work 
and lives becomes increasingly necessary. Economists have long suggested that this 
desire for balance has driven women’s human capital investment and occupation choice. 
This need to balance work and family lives may have caused women to avoid 
occupations that might otherwise be chosen if employers were willing to adopt policies 
that promoted flexibility and encouraged a balance between work and family lives. 
Individuals must decide how to allocate their time between work and home. If individuals 
have at home responsibilities during the standard 9-to-5 work day, they will be limited in 
the number of occupations that they can choose to enter. If flexible work arrangements 
are available can expand the choice set for individuals. Flexible work arrangements are 
defined as the ability to alter one’s work schedules in order to tend to unexpected family 
needs.  
The influence of work life balance on occupational choice was first examined by 
Polachek (1981). He examines a model in which he explores the effect of human capital 
depreciation and expected time out of the labor force on occupational choice. Polachek 
postulates that intermittent labor force participation effects occupational choice and that 
the probability of entering an occupation given one’s life time labor force participation 
varies with the occupation’s atrophy rate. That is, individuals with high expected 
absences from the labor force are more likely to enter occupations with low atrophy rates. 
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One would expect that individuals who take time away from the labor force to raise 
families would enter occupations that least penalizes human capital depreciation. 
Polachek concludes that this leads to occupational sorting between men and women and 
that occupational segregation between men and women is not due to discrimination. 
Table 1.1 shows the most female and male occupations in 2000 and the differences 
between men and women’s occupational distribution. 
Budig and England (2001) estimate the wage penalty of motherhood that is due to 
short term exiting of the labor force to raise children. They find that each child reduces 
wages by approximately 7 percent when estimating a fixed effects model and controlling 
for various job characteristics and experience. Because it is costly to take time off work 
to raise a family in terms of lost wages other mechanisms are needed to reduce the cost of 
raising a family.  Due to this effect on wages a tool is needed to reduce the costs 
associated with work-life balance. One such mechanism are flexible work arrangements 
in which individuals can vary the start or end time of their work days in order to meet 
their family needs. 
In this paper I explore the effects of flexible work arrangements on occupational 
choice of young college graduates and how the effect differs between men and women 
and by family structure. I implement a random utility model of occupational choice 
taking into the working conditions of the occupation including flexible work 
arrangements. I find that flexible work schedules are a desirable job characteristic for 
men and women. However, the willingness to pay between flexible schedules and other 
working conditions is typically higher for men relative to women. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner: in section 2, I 
discuss the role of the United States’ government push towards flexible work week and 
their benefits to employers and employees. In section 3, I discuss various measures that 
have been used to quantify flexible work schedules and important results from preceding 
works. In section 4, I describe the construction of the data set. In section 5, I discuss an 
occupational choice model from a random utility model that DeLeire and Levy (2004) 
use. Next, in section 6, I present the empirical model that I use to estimate the theoretical 
model. In section 7, I discuss the results. In section 8, I explore one potential cause of 
men’s greater desire for flexibility than women. Finally I conclude in section 9. 
1.2 BENEFITS TO FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS. 
Galinsky et al (2004), Landauer (1997), and Halpern (2005), discuss the benefits 
of flexible work schedules.
1
   
From the employer’s perspective flexible work arrangements can reduce 
absenteeism, increase employee morale, and decrease employee turnover which increases 
productivity and ultimately may lead to increased profit. But providing flexible work 
arrangements are not costless to provide and the marginal costs of providing flexible 
work arrangements will be equated to the marginal benefits of providing them. Because 
                                                 
1
 In 1982, the Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act was passed by Congress. 
This law allowed federal agencies to permit their employees to vary the start and end time of their work day 
while working a core period of the day. It also allowed employees to work a compressed schedule in which 
they would have every Friday off while working 10 hours per day Monday through Thursday. In 1994, 
agencies were directed to expand the use of flexible work arrangements to create family-friendly 
workplaces. The use of flexible work arrangements was advocated for by the government for numerous 
reasons including, increasing parental involvement in children’s lives, increasing occupational equality 
among men and women, and increase profits for firms. 
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these benefits are costly one would expect that there would be a tradeoff between flexible 
work arrangements and wages or other desirable job attributes. 
The benefits of flexible work schedules for employees are quite clear. Employees 
are able to adjust their work schedules in order to meet the obligations of their family 
lives. It is also well documented that flexible work schedules can also yield benefits to 
employers. Landauer (1997) shows through several case studies that flexible work 
schedules increase employee productivity, increases employee retention, and decreases 
absenteeism. Lineberry and Trumble (2000) confirm these results using data from Aon 
Consulting’s America @ Work study. 
Of course, if flexibility of work scheduled increased worker productivity 
sufficiently and universally, one would expect such flexibility to be as omnipresent as air 
conditioning.  Presumably, the cost of providing flexible work arrangements varies across 
employers and within an employer, across occupations. When coordination among 
workers is necessary it will be more costly for the firm to implement flexible work 
arrangements such as in engineering firms. 
Since there are benefits of flexible work schedules to both employers and 
employees, it is expected that flexible work schedules would be a desirable attribute of a 
job. Flexible work schedules can increase productivity of workers where they can be 
implemented. Employees gain the option value of being able to adjust their work 
schedules to personal lives’ needs. 
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1.3 MEASURING FLEXIBILITY OF WORK ARRANGEMENTS 
Flexible work schedules have been defined in various ways in the literature. I 
follow Golden (2001) and McMenamin (2007) who examine the Current Population 
Survey Work Schedule Supplement. In the CPS Work Schedule Supplement the question 
is asked “do you have a flexible work schedule, in which you can vary the start or end 
time of your work day?” Golden observed that flexible work schedule have increased in 
availability between 1985 and 1997 and that working long hours increases the probability 
that an individual has access to flexible work schedules. He shows that access to flexible 
work schedules is related to an individual’s demographic group, mainly gender and 
education 
Other measures of flexibility used in the literature measure something other than 
an individual’s ability to influence one’s work schedule. For example, Lombard (2001) 
uses the number of weekly hours worked and the absolute deviance from the 40 hour 
work week to measure workplace flexibility. However this is a measure of labor supply 
rather than flexibility.  Booth and van Ours (2008) also use the number of weekly hours 
worked to measure flexibility. They argue that an additional hour worked reduces the 
amount of time one can spend on family activities
2
.  
Work schedule flexibility as measured in the CPS Work Schedule Supplements 
provides a measure of how individuals can influence their work day in order to meet their 
personal needs. It is measured by asking survey respondents the question “do you have a 
                                                 
2
 While it is true that by working more hours in a week an individual will have fewer degrees of freedom to 
choose non-work hours. However, one might be required to work 20 hours a week at a required time 
compared to someone who is required to work 50 hours per week whenever they choose. Under Booth and 
van Ours the first individual has a more flexible work week but in actuality they supply few labor hours. 
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flexible work schedule in which you can vary the start or end time of you work day?”
3
 I 
use flexible work hours as my variable of interest since I believe it best measures an 
employee’s ability to influence one’s own work-life balance. The measures used by 
Lombard and Booth and van Ours, do not measure the ability of worker to more easily 
balance their work and family lives but rather how much labor is supplied.  
1.4 DATA  
I estimate the occupational choice model using a sample of individuals drawn 
from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses. These data are preferable to other data sets 
because of their large sample size, thus permitting me to examine occupational choice at 
the three-digit level. In addition to information on occupational choice, the Census data 
contain detailed demographic information on each individual. The large sample size of 
the Censuses also permits estimation of the occupational model across a wide range of 
demographic groups.  
The Census data permit me to construct measures of workplace flexibility defined 
in terms of hours worked per week, as well as by whether individuals work full or part 
time. Measures of flexibility are also obtained from the Current Population Survey Work 
Schedule Supplement which asks respondents about their use of time and their ability to 
adjust their schedule. 
                                                 
3
Other measures of flexibility are also available in the CPS Work Schedule Supplement, such as “does your 
company offer a formal flexible schedule program?” “how often do you work at home?” and “do you work 
at home for family reasons?” Unfortunately not all of these questions are asked in each of the survey years 
of the CPS Work Schedule Supplement. Furthermore the hours worked measures can be calculated directly 
from the Census.  
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I obtain flexible work schedules from the CPS Work Schedule Supplement for the 
years: 1985, 1991, 1997, 2001, and 2004. The Census data will be supplemented with 
working conditions data from the Occupational Information Network (O*Net).
4
 In this 
section I will describe the construction of the data used in this analysis and discuss 
summary statistics of the key variables that are used. 
A. Sample to be Analyzed 
Although individuals are free to choose, at least in principle, any occupation at 
any stage of their life, in practice, a number of constraints affect older workers that are 
less likely to be a factor in the choices of younger workers.
5
 Therefore, following 
DeLeire and Levy, I restrict my sample to young adults in the civilian labor force 
between the ages 25 and 35.  
The occupational choice model requires that individuals be free to choose 
amongst all of the occupations, at least conditional on job characteristics. In practice, this 
is unlikely to be the literally the case. To come as close to this ideal as possible, I restrict 
the sample to individuals who have a college degree and who work at least 35 weeks per 
year. Individuals with less than a college degree are closed off from a large number of 
occupations, a side-effect of which is to produce counterintuitive results such as 
individuals preferring occupations that pay lower wages.
6
 Individuals who work fewer 
than 35 weeks per year may be less than fully committed to the labor force, and may 
                                                 
4
 The O*Net is the successor to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 
5
 For example, individuals acquire job-specific human capital that may tie them to a particular occupation 
even when conditions in that occupation have changed.  
6
 College graduates are defined as those who report having a college degree in the 2000 Census, and as 
those who report having completed four or more years of college in the 1980 and 1990 data. 
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include a substantial number of individuals in temporary jobs, which do not involve a 
long-term job match and therefore should be studied separately.  
B. Defining Flexibility of Work Schedule 
There are 3 types of flexibility measures that have been studied in the literature, 
measures based on the hours worked per week, measures based on survey respondents, 
and formal flexible programs. Work flexibility is the ability to adjust one’s work schedule 
in order to meet the needs of unexpected events in one’s personal life.  
There are many definitions of flexible work hours used in the literature. Many of 
these measures can be derived using Census data on hours worked per week. These 
include indicator variables for hours worked greater than 50, hours worked less than 35, 
and hours worked less than 30; hour deviance measures are also created, number of hours 
worked minus 40, absolute value of hours worked minus 40, and the standard deviation 
of hours worked within an occupation.  
For the weekly hours worked measures I take the mean by occupation. These 
measures can be interpreted as the percentage of workers who work long hours or short 
hours. The deviance from 40 hours measures can be interpreted as the average hours from 
40 that individuals in an occupation work. 
In the Current Population Survey Work Schedule Supplement survey respondents 
are asked about their participation in flexible work arrangements. These measures are 
flexible work schedules, formal flexible work program, work at home at least once a 
week, and work at home for family reasons. I calculate the percentage of workers who 
have access to each measure of flexibility by occupation.  
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C. Sample Statistics 
Summary statistics for the various flexibility measures can be found in Table 1.2 
for all demographic groups combined over time. By all measures access to flexible work 
arrangements has increased between 1980 and 2000. The standard 40 hour work is 
disappearing as more workers are working over 50 hours a week at the same time more 
workers are working less than 35 hours per week. Individuals working more than 50 
hours per week increased from 16% to 22% between 1980 and 2000; while those working 
less than 30 hours a week increased from 7.7% to 8.8% over the same time period.  
The number of individuals with flexible schedules has rapidly increased from 
12% in 1980 to 34% in 2000. Only 9% of young working college graduates participate in 
formal employer sponsored programs. This implies that the majority of workers who 
have flexible work arrangements have informal arrangements with their employers. 
Using the formal flexible measure would under estimate the number of people who have 
flexible work arrangements leading to estimates in which individuals under value flexible 
work arrangements. 
Table 1.3 compares flexibility measures for all men and women for the pooled 
years 1980-2000. Notice that men tend to longer days. Twenty-seven percent of men 
work 50 hours or more per week while only 10% of women do the same. Women are also 
more likely to work part time (less than 30 hours per week) compared to men (15% vs. 
4%). However approximately equal numbers of men and women are able to take 
advantage of flexible work arrangements or have a formal flexible work schedule 
program available to them. 
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Marital status and parental status also influence work hours
7
. Married men tend to 
work longer hours than do single men but parental status has little effect on men’s work 
schedules. However, married women tend to work fewer hours per week than their single 
counterparts. And mothers tend to work less compared to childless women. 
The percentage of workers with flexible schedules varies across occupation. In 
most occupations between 20% and 40% of workers have the ability to vary their start 
time or end time of their work day. Occupations that have 100% flexibility are small 
occupations such as shoe repairers. However, there are many occupations that have no 
flexibility available. For example, occupations that require shift work including, prison 
guards, crane and winch operators, and lathe operators. Occupations that access to 
roughly average amounts of work schedule flexibility are customer service 
representatives (0.31), podiatrists (0.33), legal assistants (0.35), and accountants (0.37).  
The measures of flexibility will be correlated with each other since they are 
measuring the same job attribute in various ways. Table 1.4 shows the correlation among 
the numerous measures of flexibility. As expected the hourly measures are correlated 
among each other and the flexibility measures defined from the Current Population 
Survey are strongly correlated with each other with the exception of formal flexible 
programs. There is moderate correlation among the measures defined by hours worked 
per week and the CPS defined survey measures. This implies that similar results should 
                                                 
7
 Causation could also work in the other direction in which work hours determine marital and parental 
status. 
 11 




D. Other Occupational Attributes 
These characteristics were chosen since they represent characteristics of the firm 
rather than characteristics of the individual who is choosing his or her occupation. This 
reduces the likelihood that these variables are endogenous.
9
 These attributes include: 
physical safety on the job, human capital accumulation, self-directed, attending to others, 
and workplace competitiveness.
10
 Physical safety on the job is a measure of risk, in terms 
of injury or death, which is assumed on the job. DeLeire and Levy examine the effects of 
risk on occupational choice and find that risk on the job is a deterrent for individuals to 
enter a particular occupation. Human capital accumulation represents the average 
commitment in years to proficiently perform the occupation. The variable self-directed 
measures individuals’ control over their daily work tasks. Attending to others is a 
measure of how much help individuals are required to give to clients or their co-workers 
in their daily tasks.  Finally, workplace competitiveness is included and measures how 
competitive promotions within the company are and how the firm competes with other 
companies for clients. Croson and Gneezy (2009) found that women may dislike 
competitive work environments leading to gender differences in occupational 
distributions.  
                                                 
8
 I have used various measures of flexibility in the occupational choice. There is little difference in the 
results among the various measures. The results are available upon request. 
9
 Because there is complex matching problem between workers and firms in which heterogeneous workers 
to firms with different requirements, this paper side steps this difficulty and instead focuses on 
characteristics that should, in principle, be available – at a price – to all workers. 
10
 The Occupational Information Network Database records exposure to hazardous conditions. For ease of 
interpretation I transform this to exposure to safe conditions by taking the negative of measure. 
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 Summary statistics for the O*Net characteristics can be found in Table 1.5. Most 
of the controls used in the model are determined by an arbitrary scale and these variables 
are ordinal rather than cardinal, where larger number represents a greater importance, 
higher level, or greater exposure to the characteristics. Physical safety in the workplace is 
a measure of risk to individuals and smaller numbers imply a greater hazard on the job 
site. In order to calculate human capital accumulation I impute the value from a series of 
O*Net variables that measure the percent of workers within an occupation that have 
received training for a certain period of time. The imputed measure represents the 
average number of years that workers train on the job in a particular occupation. Self-
directed jobs allow employees more leeway and less supervision from their bosses on 
assignments or projects. Attending to others is a measure of how important aiding others 
is on the job; occupations that score high in this area are clergy, funeral home directors 
and nurses while accountants, engineers, and salespersons score low. Competitive 
workplace is a measure of both internal and external competition at the occupation. 
Internal competition refers to the rivalry among coworkers for promotions while external 
competition refers the competition for new business or sales among firms. 
1.5 OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL 
I adopt the random utility model for occupational choice found in DeLeire and 
Levy. Individuals choose from a large but finite number of occupations. DeLeire and 
Levy assume a generic utility function in which an individual will receive utility from the 
wage he or she receives, the attributes of the occupation, and personal characteristics. 
This can be expressed as: 
 13 
 ( , , , ),ij i ij j jU U X W FLEX Z                 
(1.1) 
where i represents individuals and j represents occupations. Xi is a vector of personal 
characteristics that include characteristics such as gender, marital status, and parental 
status. The wages received by an individual are a function of personal characteristics (Xi) 
and job attributes (Zj): 
 ( , , ).ij i j jW f X FLEX Z       (1.2) 
Substituting equation (1.2) into (1.1) and assuming a linear functional form 
yields: 
 ,ij i j j ijU X FLEX Z              (1.3) 
where, εij is the error term which is independent and identically distributed as type-I 
extreme value. Assuming individuals are utility maximizers, occupation j will be chosen 
if: 
 .  ij ikU U j k         (1.4) 
Let Iij = 1 if individual i chooses occupation j and zero otherwise. Given the 
assumption of type-I extreme values errors the model can be estimated using McFadden’s 



















  (1.5) 
Note that the effect of individual characteristics, δ, cannot be identified in the above 
equation since δ Xi will drop out of the equation. Only the parameter estimates of the job 
characteristics can be obtained. 
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1.6 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
I take advantage of the equivalence of the log-likelihood function of Poisson 
regression model to the conditional logit model. The Poisson model allows the estimation 
of a large number of choices that would otherwise be too computationally burdensome 
using the conditional logit model. Some papers that have taken advantage of this 
formulation are Chen and Kuo (2001) and Chen, Duann, and Hu (2005). 
Woodward (1992), Guimarães, Rolfe and Woodward (1998), and Figueiredo et al 










  (1.6) 
and nj is the number of individuals who choose occupation j and pj is the probability that 
occupation j is chosen . 
Alternatively, let nj be independently and identically distributed as Poisson. The 
Poisson regression model specifies that nj is drawn from a Poisson distribution with 
parameter λj, the probability that Nj is realized for any occupation j is  




j j j j
j
e





          (1.7) 
Let λj be expressed as  
 exp( )j jz           (1.8) 
and the expected number of individuals to choose occupation j within a given Census 
year is 
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 [ | ] [ | ] exp( ),j j j j jE n z V n z z            (1.9) 













        (1.10) 
The log-likelihood function can be written as  
 
1
log ( log log !).
J
P j j j j
j
L n n 

      (1.11) 
Substituting equation (1.2) into equation (1.5) yields 
 
1
log [ exp( ) ( ) log !].
J
P j j j j
j
L z n z n   

       (1.12) 













   
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    (1.14) 
N is the total number of individuals across all occupations. Substituting (14) into (12) and 
some simplification yields 
 
1 1
log log log log !.
J J
P j j j
j j
L n p N N N n
 
       (1.15) 
Notice that the first term on the right hand side of equation (1.15) is equivalent to 
the right hand side of equation (1.6). The remaining terms on the right hand side of 
equation (1.15) are equal to a constant and nj is an independently distributed as a Poisson 
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distribution and is the number of individuals who select occupation j. The estimates 
obtained by maximizing equation (1.15) will be identical to those obtained by 
maximizing (1.6), as the standard errors in both models will also be identical because 
they are formed by the identical Hessian matrix (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).
11
  
 The coefficient estimates of the occupational choice model can be interpreted as 
marginal utility. The ratio of the marginal utilities for any two characteristics is defined 
as the marginal rate of substitution. The marginal rate of substitution is defined as the 
cost to obtain one more unit of flexibility. The marginal rate of substitution between 















       (1.16) 
If ˆ 0  then the characteristics is a desirable attribute of a job and the MRS between 
characteristic X and flexibility can be interpreted as how many units of characteristic X 
an individual is willing to give up to obtain an additional unit of flexibility. If ˆ 0  then 
the characteristics is an undesirable attribute. The MRS can now be interpreted as how 
many units of characteristic X an individual is willing to accept in order to obtain an 
additional unit of flexibility. 
                                                 
11
 In order to yield consistent predictions across the conditional logit and Poisson model a transformation 
needs to be made. The Poisson model predicts the number of individuals in an occupation. The conditional 
logit model predicts the probabilities that an individual will choose a particular occupation. Thus to obtain 
predicted probabilities from the Poisson model, the predicted counts must be divided by the total predicted 
count of individuals across all occupations. 
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1.7 RESULTS 
A. Pooled Data 
I first estimate equation (1.15) separately for men and women across all years. In 
this specification I include a set of dummy variables for the year. Results are found in 
Table 1.6. The availability of flexible work schedules increases the utility of a particular 
occupation for both men and women since it provides an option value to individuals; for 
the remainder of the paper I measure flexibility as the ability to vary the start or end time 
of one’s job. Demographic groups cannot be compared directly across regressions but 
rather marginal rates of substitution must be estimated.  
The choice model estimated here makes clear that it is not possible to infer 
whether women prefer flexible schedules relative to men without specifying what they 
prefer it to. One natural measure is wages. However in DeLeire and Levy’s methodology, 
the endogenous variable has been solved out of the model and the random utility model is 
estimated as a reduced form function of job characteristics. In this case one can only 
compare the value men and women place on flexibility relative to their preferences for 
other job characteristics. 
There are no natural units for the occupation attributes but are measured on the 
same scale for men and women and the MRS should be comparable across groups. The 
results are displayed in Table 1.7. The estimated MRS for flexibility with physical safety 




 Since men are willing to give up more safety relative to women, men value 
flexibility in terms of safety more than women. A higher MRS for flexibility with respect 
to some other desirable job characteristic indicates that the willingness to pay is higher. 
In particular if men value flexibility more than women relative to physical safety then the 
estimated MRS should be higher for men than for women. 
Men are also more willing to sacrifice on the job training and unstructured jobs, in 
exchange for greater flexibility. On average, assisting or caring for others is an undesired 
characteristic for men and women. The MRS for flexibility with respect to attending to 
others is -2.8 for women and is -1.8 for men. 
B. Estimates by Decade 
Next I consider whether the value of flexible work schedules has changed over 
time. I estimate equation (1.15) separately for men and women for each Census year. I 
relegate the full results to the Appendix Table A1 and focus on the marginal rates of 
substitution. Table 1.8 reports the MRS between flexibility and other characteristics for 
men and women by each year. The estimates indicate men have become increasingly will 
to sacrifice physical safety on the job in exchange for greater work schedule flexibility. 
By contrast, there is no significant trend for women. The MRS for flexibility and job 
safety increased by 53% between 1980 and 1990 from 0.35 to 0.60, the MRS for 
flexibility with safety declined by 35% to just 0.42. In only one of decadal years – 1990 – 
was the estimated MRS between flexible schedules and physical safety higher for women 
                                                 
12
 Literally speaking, the MRS for flexibility with respect to physical safety on the job for men means that 
the individual’s utility is unchanged by compensating them with 1 unit of flexibility for sacrificing 0.83 
unit of physical safety. 
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than for men. It is not surprising that women have such a high preference for physical job 
safety relative to men. 
There is evidence that women have become increasingly willing to trade the 
opportunity for human capital accumulation on the job for flexible schedules. However 
the estimates indicate that men valued flexible schedules more than women in 1990 and 
2000. 
Both men and women were willing to sacrifice self-directed for flexible schedules 
in greater amounts in 2000 than in 1980. Women went from a higher MRS between 
flexible schedules and self-directed than men in 1980 and 1990 to a lower MRS by 2000. 
C. Estimates by Marital and Parental Status 
One might expect the demand for flexible schedules to vary as a function of 
marital and parental status. For example, women with children might be expected to have 
a higher demand for flexible schedules than women without children. I estimate equation 
(1.15) by demographic groups defined by gender, marital status, and parental status. 
The occupational choice estimates can be found in Appendix Table A2 for the 
pooled results from 1980-2000 and the marginal rates of substitution are found in Table 
1.9. Even after dividing individuals into multiple groups men value flexibility more than 
women in each of the marital-parental subgroups for most characteristics. For example, 
the MRS for flexibility with respect to physical safety is 7.94 for married men without 
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kids and 3.89 for married women without kids. Similarly the MRS is 1.89 for single men 
without kids and 0.67 for single women without kids.
13
  
Of the eight demographic groups, mothers, especially single mothers, are the least 
willing to sacrifice physical safety for flexible schedules while fathers, especially single 
fathers, are the most willing to accept physical risk. The MRS for flexible schedules with 
respect to safety is 0.19 for single mothers and is 2.29 for single fathers. Mothers might 
be more risk adverse and less willing to give up flexible work arrangements than non-
mothers because they are the primary care-giver to their children.  
Married mothers are more willing than single mothers to accept less desirable 
working conditions in exchange for more flexible work arrangements. Single mothers 
might be more reluctant to accept positions in which they are required to work long 
hours. From Beers (2000) it is known that flexible work schedules are correlated with 
working long hours. Single mothers may want to spend more time away from work to 
care for their children. There might also be other attributes that single mothers find 
desirable that are omitted from the regressions that are causing single mothers to enter 
occupations where flexible work arrangements are not available. 
Single fathers and married fathers have similar MRS between flexible schedules 
and other job attributes; this implies that fathers regardless of marital status have similar 
willingness to pay for flexible work arrangements in terms of various attributes. The 
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 Conversely the MRS for flexible schedules with respect to workplace competitiveness is 2.06 for married 
mothers and 1.09 for married fathers. This suggests that married mothers are more willing to sacrifice 
competitiveness than married father. This is supported by Kleinjans (2009) who finds that women have a 
greater distaste for competitive work environments than men.  
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MRS for married fathers is 2.23 and 2.29 for single fathers. Given the size of the standard 
errors these are not significantly different.  
I now examine how MRS’s varies for married and single non-parents. There is 
little difference in the MRS for flexibility with safety between married women and single 
women for any of the tradeoffs. But, for men there are differences for married and single 
men; the MRS is 2.00 for married men and 1.56 for single men without kids. Married 
men value flexibility more than single men in terms of safety.  
Finally I examine how the marginal rate of substitutions for these characteristics 
over time for each demographic group. For married fathers, married men and women 
without kids, single fathers, and single women without kids, flexibility has become 
relatively more important between 1980 and 2000 in terms of safety. But in terms of on 
the job training, flexibility has become more important for each demographic group
14
. 
The MRS between flexibility and unstructured jobs has increased over time for 
demographic groups except for married and single mothers. Individuals are increasingly 
willing to forgo greater amounts of desirable job characteristics overtime to increase the 
amount of flexibility available in one’s work schedule. 
1.8 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
A. Alternative Measures of Flexibility 
Various measures of flexibility have been used in the past to study the effects of 
flexibility on wages and in other studies. Here I explore the effects of the standard 
deviation of hours within an occupation, the difference from a forty hour work week, and 
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 The MRS between flexibility and on the job training for single mothers has remained roughly constant 
between 1980 and 2000. 
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the absolute difference from a forty hour work week on occupation choice. After 
individually examining the effects of these characteristics I explore the combined effects 
of these measures of flexibility with my preferred measure of flexibility.  
 I estimate equation 1.15 once again separately for men and women with the data 
pooled across the three Census years. The results can be found in Table 1.11 for women 
and Table 1.12 for men. Column one estimates the effects of the standard deviation of 
hours within an occupation on occupational choice. Occupations with larger standard 
deviations of hours mean that there is a greater the variance of hours worked by 
employees in the occupation and the more likely that individuals will work varying 
schedules each week. The greater the variability in hours worked per week the more 
likely women and men are to choose particular occupations. But the increase in marginal 
utility from standard deviation of hours is about one-fifth of increase from flexible 
schedules for both men and women. Columns 2 and 3 report the effects of hours minus 
forty and the absolute value of this term on occupational choice. For both women and 
men these effects are of about equal magnitude as the standard deviation of hours; but the 
impact of hours minus forty for women is relatively small (one-third the size of standard 
deviation of hours) on occupation choice compared to other measures. 
 Columns 4 through 6 include the variable flexible schedules in the specifications 
from columns 1 through 3. For men the addition of flexible schedules diminishes the 
effect of the alternative measure of flexibility. The introduction of flexible schedules 
causes the impact of standard deviation of hours and absolute hours minus forty to 
increase and the impact of hours minus forty to decrease for women.  
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 Specification 7 includes flexible schedule and all alternative measures. These 
measures remain statistically significant since they are picking up different aspects of the 
job. Standard deviation of hours is measuring the variability in hours which are likely to 
be dictated by the employer rather than employees; deviation from forty and absolute 
deviate from forty are measures of how long individuals are working in an occupation. In 
this specification part time flexibility is also introduced.
15
 Now, women do not like 
standard deviation of hours but do like part time flexibility; women want to be in control 
of schedules which part time flexibility allows them to do whereas standard deviation of 
hours their schedule is being dictated to them. The later measure does not allow 
individuals to meet have flexibility in order to meet personal needs. 
 However for men the standard deviation of hours remains positive and part time 
flexibility is negative. This implies that men prefer flexible schedules over part time work 
even if means that their employer is dictating to them when they can take off.  
 These results further show that flexibility and part time work are substitutes for 
women so they can reduce the amount of time spent at the office. The next subsection 
details these results by demographic group and focuses on the flexible schedule measure 
and part time flexibility measure. These specifications show that the impact of flexibility 
on occupational choice remains robust when varying measures are used separately and 
included at once.  
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 Part time flexibility is defined as the percentage of people in an occupation who work part time.  
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B. Part Time Jobs as a Substitute for Schedule Flexibility 
 My measure of schedule flexibility refers to the ability of an individual employee 
to shift around hours worked in a given day by starting or finishing work earlier or later 
at the margin.  Such flexibility of schedules is more common in occupations in which 
long hours are more frequent (Golden 2001). However, such flexibility may not be 
sufficient to satisfy individuals who have high demands for large blocks of time to devote 
to non-work activities.  Individuals with high demands for large blocks of time may be 
particularly attracted to occupations in which it is relatively easy to work part time.  I 
measure the ease of arranging part time work in an occupation as the percentage of 
individuals who work part time.   
Of course, this percentage is an equilibrium outcome in the market for nonwage 
characteristics and not merely a technological feature of the occupation. However, in the 
current context, it seems a reasonable approximation. In addition, the decision to work in 
such jobs contains an element of labor supply – that is, the demand for nonmarket time – 
as well as the demand for being able to rearrange a given number of hours worked.  It is, 
the decision to work part time and the decision to work in an occupation in which part 
time work is relatively frequent are both conceptually and empirically distinct. 
 I estimate equation 1.15 and the results can be found in Table 1.13 for men and 
women for data pooled across years. First notice that flexibility continues to be a good for 
both men and women increasing marginal utility by approximately 0.6 utils for women 
and 1.2 utils for men an increase in flexibility on the job. Women are attracted to 
occupations where there is greater ease for working part time but men are attracted into 
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jobs that have lower opportunities for part time work. This suggests that women do value 
the opportunity to have access to flexibility in the workplace in order to more easily 
balance their personal lives and work lives. This shows a difference in the way that men 
and women utilize flexible work schedules. Women are using flexible work schedules as 
a substitute for part time employment, which also provides the ability to balance work 
and personal lives. Men however are attracted into flexible jobs but away from part time 
work this implies that men are seeking ways to balance work and personal lives without 
sacrificing earnings potential.  
 Table 1.14 shows the marginal rates of substitution between flexible work 
schedules and other workplace characteristics. The MRS for schedule flexibility with 
respect to ease to work part time is 0.34 for women and -0.31 for men. Men must be 
compensated with flexibility in order to accept part-time work and keep utility constant.  
 It is plausible that married women or mothers maybe driving the result that 
women are using part time work as a substitute for flexible work schedules rather than 
single women without kids who are more likely to be career women and who are 
supported by from their spouse’s income for through child support. Table 1.15 reports the 
estimate of equation 1.15 by demographic group and Table 1.16 records the MRS’s 
between flexibility and other workplace characteristics.  
 Married mothers are the most willing to sacrifice part time work in exchange for 
flexible work schedules but single mothers are the least willing. And single women 
without kids have approximately the same MRS between flexibility and part time work as 
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the full female sample; it thus unlikely that married women or mothers are driving the 
results. 
 It is further worth noting that single men without kids are the least willing to 
accept part time employment, and married fathers are least resistant to accepting part time 
employment. This suggests that earnings potential is more important to men than working 
shorter hours and that married fathers are more willing to accept part time employment in 
order to support their families where single men without kids do not have these 
obligations are able to choose jobs that do not balance work and personal lives as well as 
other jobs. 
 These results suggest that while men are willing to sacrifice safety to obtain 
flexible jobs in greater amounts relative to women, women value flexibility in their jobs 
and are willing to accept part time employment in order to balance work and personal 
lives. Part time work is a substitute for flexibility for women but not for men. Men are 
deterred from choosing jobs in where there are a large percentage of part time employees 
instead choosing jobs that have flexible jobs available to them. From the hours worked 
regression I showed that men increased their average hours worked when in a flexible job 
but women decreased their hours worked. Women are using flexible work schedules as a 
mechanism to reduce their work burden in order to increase the amount of time they have 
to take on personal responsibilities. 
C. Endogeneity of Part Time Work 
The decision to work part time is endogenous. Workers who most wish to work 
part time will enter occupations with the lowest cost of providing part time job 
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opportunities. Workers choose not only what occupation they wish to go into but also 
how many hours to work. This introduces bias in the estimates if it is unaccounted. In 
order to control for this I allow for individuals to simultaneously choosing what 
occupation to work and to work full time or part time. 
By introducing this into the model I am accounting for the fact that workers do 
uniformly supply the same amount of labor and that they must also choose how much 
they want to work. Allowing for individuals to choose to work full time or part time is a 
first approximation of this decision. Some occupations may provide low cost 
opportunities for firms to allow part time work such as retail sales while other 
occupations may not such as teaching. Because firms have different costs of 
administering this attributes individuals and firms will match based on their preferences 
and costs. 
In order to estimate this model I must allow each individual to choose both 
occupation and whether to work full time or part time simultaneously. Each occupation 
now has two observations one of which records the number of full time workers and the 
other records the number of part time workers. Individuals will choose occupation, j and 
hours, h if 
  or .ijh iklU U j k h l           (1.17) 
Let Iijh = 1 if individual i chooses occupation j and hours h and zero otherwise. Given the 
assumption of type-I extreme values errors the model can be estimated using McFadden’s 
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Equation 1.15 can now be re-estimated with the decision to work full time or part time 
embedded in the model. To capture the effects of part time work an indicator variable is 
included. Table 1.17 reports the results by gender. 
Scheduling flexibility remains a desirable attribute of occupations for both men 
and women; this increases marginal utility for both groups of individuals. Ease to work 
part time decreases utility for men and women but being in an occupation with part time 
flexibility increases the desirability of the job for women and decreases it for men. This 
shows that even when controlling for the endogeneity of the part time work women still 
like part time flexibility. Women are willing to sacrifice flexible schedules for ease of 
working part nearly one-to-one; this suggests that women prefer the ability to obtain 
flexibility by various means to better balance work and personal lives. 
D. Occupation Skill Level Segmentation 
Occupational choice models also face the difficulty that not all jobs are available 
to all individuals. This can lead to results that do not match with economic theory. For 
example, consider the NBA; pro basketball players get paid millions of dollars but yet 
only there are only 450 NBA players in the nation. Playing in the NBA is a desirable job 
that thousands of college students try to become pros each year. Because only a limited 
number of people are NBA players and not every job is available to every person, the 
occupational choice model may show results that are not in line with economic theory 
such as higher wages having negative marginal utility.  
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In order to address this problem I segment the data into low skilled occupations 
and high skilled occupations. High skilled occupations likely attract individuals with a 
broader range of choices, where low skilled occupations may attract workers with a more 
limited choice set. High skilled occupations are defined as having greater than or equal to 
the median levels of mathematical reason skills and inductive reasoning skills.
16
 There 
are roughly equal numbers of low and high skilled occupations. 
Table 1.18 reports the results by skill level for men and women. From Table 1.17, 
part time flexibility attracted women into occupations but was a deterrent for men. In 
Table 1.18 workers in high skilled occupations are deterred from jobs with high part time 
flexibility while workers in low skilled occupations are attracted to these jobs; this holds 
true for both men and women. However it remains true that women are still more 
attracted to part time flexibility relative to men regardless of occupation segmentation.  
The results discussed here show that men and women like flexibility in their jobs. 
Men are more willing to sacrifice to obtain flexible schedules but are not willing to use 
part time flexibility to obtain work and personal lives balance. Women however are 
willing to utilize both flexibility and part time flexibility. However when looking at high 
occupations versus low skilled occupations only workers in low skilled occupations were 
willing to make the tradeoff between flexible schedules and part time flexibility. Workers 
in high skilled occupations needed to be compensated to accept occupations with high 
part time flexibility. 
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 Alternative definitions of high skilled occupations were examined and the results remain robust. 
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1.9 CONCLUSION 
My results show that flexible work hours are an important determinant of an 
individual’s occupation choice. Flexible work hours allow individuals to more easily 
balance work and family lives. While both men and women enjoy flexible work hours, 
men rather than women are willing to sacrifice more in order to obtain flexible work 
hours. This sacrifice may come in the form of less safety of the work site or more 
independence of the job through an unstructured job.  
 Over time flexible work hours have become more influential for individuals in 
determining occupational outcomes. This is especially true for married individuals but 
not single mothers. Single mothers were either pushed into less flexible occupations or 
actively sought them out in order to obtain a schedule that matched their child’s. This 
could be due to various reasons including increases in technological use which make it 
easier to stay in contact with co-workers. Why flexible work hours have become 
important is a question that is left unanswered for another paper. 
 The fact that men are more willing to sacrifice desirable job characteristics in 
greater amounts may seem puzzling at first glance. However this is occurring at a time 
when women are entering the labor force in greater numbers and men are looking for 
ways to balance work and personal lives. The logit results show that there is a positive 
correlation between female labor force participation and the probability that men choose 
flexible jobs. 
My results show that men and women are sorting into different occupations based 
on preferences for flexibility and that flexible work schedules is an important determinant 
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in occupational choice models. Differences in flexible work schedules account for 
approximately 33% of the occupational gender gap among young college graduates. As 
the need for personal and work life balance evolves the desire for flexible work 
arrangements will continue to increase and be an important determinant of occupational 




Table 1.1: Most Female and Male Occupations in 2000 














































Table 1.2: Flexibility Measures over Time 
  1980 1990 2000 
Hours Deviance Measures 
      Hours-40 1.617 2.323 2.428 
  (10.043) (10.539) (10.342) 
     |Hours-40| 5.240 5.935 6.131 
  (8.719) (9.013) (8.676) 
     Std. Dev. Of Hours within an 
     Occupation 8.961 9.647 9.499 
  (2.290) (2.092) (1.871) 
Hours Worked per Week Indicators 
     30- 0.077 0.084 0.088 
  (0.266) (0.277) (0.284) 
     35- 0.117 0.122 0.127 
  (0.321) (0.327) (0.333) 
     50+ 0.160 0.201 0.223 
  (0.367) (0.401) (0.417) 
Direct Measures 
       Flexible Hours 0.118 0.287 0.341 
  (0.165) (0.271) (0.265) 
     Formal Flexible Program - 0.090 0.096 
  - (0.064) (0.064) 
     Work at Home 1+ times a week - 0.140 0.151 
  - (0.135) (0.149) 
     Work at Home Family Reasons - 0.009 0.010 
  - (0.012) (0.012) 
Number of Individuals 899182 1144565 1275918 
Number of Jobs 203 205 205 




Table 1.3: Flexibility Measures Women vs. Men 
  Women Men All 
Hours Deviance Measures   
     Hours-40 -1.129 4.632 2.172 
  (9.734) (10.084) (10.336) 
     |Hours-40| 5.187 6.296 5.822 
  (8.314) (9.138) (8.813) 
     Std. Dev. Of Hours within an 
     Occupation 9.363 9.435 9.404 
  (1.882) (2.226) (2.086) 
Hours Worked per Week Indicators 
     30- 0.145 0.038 0.083 
  (0.352) (0.191) (0.277) 
     35- 0.208 0.058 0.122 
  (0.406) (0.235) (0.328) 
     50+ 0.098 0.273 .0199 
 (0.297) (0.446) (0.399) 
Direct Measures 
       Flexible Hours 0.321 0.339 0.331 
  (0.160) (0.178) (0.171) 
     Formal Flexible Program 0.098 0.088 0.092 
  (0.058) (0.068) (0.064) 
     Work at Home 1+ times a week 0.139 0.151 0.146 
  (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) 
     Work at Home Family Reasons 0.011 0.009 0.010 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
N 1416536 1901202 3319665 
Row Percent 42.7 57.3 100 
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30- 
Hours -0.248 0.180 0.227 
     
35- 
Hours -0.241 0.155 0.197 0.995 
    
50+ 
Hours 0.283 0.221 0.154 0.447 0.480 
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Exposure to Safe Conditions -2.110 -5 0 
  (1.013) 
  On the Job Training Required (Years) 0.800 0 10 
  (0.774) 
  Unstructured Job 3.798 0 5 
  (0.490) 
  Assisting or Caring for Others 2.791 1 7 
  (1.078) 
  Level of Competition 2.853 0 5 
  (0.508) 
  Number of Jobs 205 




Table 1.6: Pooled Poisson Regressions Occupational Choice 
  Female Male 
Flexible Work Schedules 0.359 0.490 
  (0.008) (0.006) 
Exposure to Safe Conditions 0.894 0.589 
  (0.005) (0.002) 
On the Job Training Required 0.118 0.070 
  (0.003) (0.002) 
Unstructured Job 0.606 0.721 
  (0.006) (0.005) 
Assisting or Caring for Others -0.127 -0.273 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Level of Competition 0.282 0.771 
  (0.004) (0.003) 
1980 -0.809 -0.046 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
1990 -0.163 -0.014 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 5.063 3.301 
  (0.025) (0.019) 
Log Likelihood -156252 -326126 
Note: There are 203 occupations in 1980 and 205 for 1990 and 2000. Exposure to safe conditions is 
the negative of exposure to hazardous conditions which is recorded by the surveyors. Standard errors 




Table 1.7: Marginal Rate of Substitutions Pooled Results 
  Female Male 
Exposure to Safe Conditions 0.402 0.833 
  (0.009) (0.011) 
On the Job Training Required 3.031 7.053 
  (0.098) (0.226) 
Unstructured Job 0.593 0.680 
  (0.016) (0.010) 
Assisting or Caring for Others -2.826 -1.799 
  (0.078) (0.025) 
Level of Competition 1.275 0.636 
  (0.033) (0.008) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis and are calculated using 
the delta-method. The MRS can be interpreted as the number of 
units of a characteristic an individual is willing to give up to 
obtain an additional unit of flexibility. Flexibility is defined as the 




Table 1.8: Marginal Rates of Substitution Over Time by Gender 
  Female Male 
Exposure to Safe Conditions 
1980 0.351 0.400 
  (0.026) (0.024) 
1990 0.599 0.538 
  (0.017) (0.017) 
2000 0.423 0.635 
  (0.013) (0.017) 
On the Job Training Required 
1980 1.295 0.782 
  (0.096) (0.049) 
1990 1.984 13.215 
  (0.073) (2.084) 
2000 3.070 5.262 
  (0.132) (0.274) 
Unstructured Job 
 1980 0.562 0.246 
  (0.043) (0.015) 
1990 0.937 0.508 
  (0.035) (0.018) 
2000 0.621 0.687 
  (0.022) (0.020) 
Assisting or Caring for Others 
1980 -11.868 -1.761 
  (2.378) (0.112) 
1990 -11.085 -1.505 
  (1.031) (0.050) 
2000 -3.262 -1.277 
  (0.127) (0.035) 
Level of Competition 
1980 -109.149 0.472 
  (322.935) (0.029) 
1990 1.119 0.512 
  (0.034) (0.015) 
2000 1.393 0.536 
  (0.049) (0.013) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis and are calculated using 
the delta-method. The MRS can be interpreted as the number of 
units of a characteristic an individual is willing to give up to 
obtain an additional unit of flexibility. Flexibility is defined as the 
ability to vary the start or end time of one’s work day. 
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Table 1.9: Marginal Rate of Substitution between Flexibility and other Characteristics   
  Married Kids Married No Kids Single Kids Single No Kids 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Exposure to 
Safe Conditions 0.313 2.231 0.468 1.976 0.188 2.293 0.441 1.557 
  (0.016) (0.030) (0.017) (0.033) (0.047) (0.298) (0.015) (0.024) 
On the Job 
Training 2.058 5.270 3.786 7.941 1.167 5.960 3.638 10.162 
  (0.129) (0.098) (0.224) (0.283) (0.314) (1.265) (0.195) (0.484) 
Unstructured 
Job 0.512 1.115 0.606 1.559 0.307 1.515 0.665 1.868 
  (0.030) (0.018) (0.026) (0.037) (0.083) (0.252) (0.027) (0.047) 
Assisting or 
Caring for 
Others -5.268 -3.263 -2.449 -2.372 -1.763 -2.022 -2.527 -1.835 
  (0.450) (0.046) (0.105) (0.040) (0.484) (0.233) (0.100) (0.028) 
Level of 
Competition 2.058 1.087 1.162 1.010 0.896 0.862 1.147 0.962 
  (0.147) (0.012) (0.048) (0.015) (0.244) (0.089) (0.043) (0.014) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis and are calculated using the delta-method. The MRS can be 
interpreted as the number of units of a characteristic an individual is willing to give up to obtain an 





Table 1.10: Marginal Rates of Substitution between Flexibility and other Characteristics   
  Married Kids Married No Kids Single Kids Single No Kids 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Exposure to Safe Conditions 
     
  
1980 0.339 0.347 0.392 0.395 0.333 0.332 0.319 0.488 
  (0.052) (0.038) (0.047) (0.049) (0.125) (0.401) (0.040) (0.043) 
1990 0.598 0.319 0.630 0.629 0.325 -0.023 0.597 0.691 
  (0.031) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.106) (0.269) (0.028) (0.027) 
2000 0.350 0.891 0.509 0.753 0.178 0.547 0.451 0.362 
  (0.022) (0.031) (0.025) (0.034) (0.064) (0.215) (0.021) (0.024) 
On the Job Training Required 
     
  
1980 1.498 0.545 1.441 0.865 1.156 0.659 1.101 1.303 
  (0.245) (0.060) (0.176) (0.111) (0.438) (0.816) (0.138) (0.125) 
1990 1.858 2.105 2.072 264.206 0.768 -0.094 2.190 -12.158 
  (0.122) (0.269) (0.139) (1285.567) (0.267) (1.069) (0.137) (1.864) 
2000 2.142 3.486 4.080 7.555 1.112 3.542 3.653 49.925 
  (0.163) (0.169) (0.334) (0.894) (0.420) (2.194) (0.273) (60.538) 
Unstructured Job 
      
  
1980 0.655 0.168 0.519 0.259 0.791 0.214 0.516 0.425 
  (0.109) (0.018) (0.065) (0.031) (0.331) (0.253) (0.068) (0.037) 
1990 1.126 0.203 0.788 0.619 0.509 -0.021 0.974 1.087 
  (0.081) (0.018) (0.051) (0.039) (0.188) (0.244) (0.060) (0.056) 
2000 0.568 0.678 0.667 0.811 0.303 0.638 0.658 0.564 
  (0.042) (0.026) (0.040) (0.043) (0.116) (0.285) (0.037) (0.041) 
Assisting or Caring for Others 
     
  
1980 8.703 -2.202 -6.232 -1.537 -5.554 -0.793 -6.847 -1.572 
  (2.405) (0.252) (1.295) (0.195) (3.436) (0.959) (1.598) (0.143) 
1990 8.877 -1.211 -4.811 -1.571 13.243 0.044 -5.752 -1.600 
  (0.989) (0.110) (0.445) (0.091) (14.077) (0.501) (0.530) (0.067) 
2000 -4.888 -2.114 -3.102 -1.431 -1.962 -0.883 -2.849 -0.661 
  (0.486) (0.083) (0.192) (0.068) (0.777) (0.352) (0.163) (0.044) 
Level of Competition 
     
  
1980 -1.283 0.397 12.007 0.436 5.901 0.280 2.699 0.655 
  (0.205) (0.043) (6.813) (0.054) (5.763) (0.337) (0.520) (0.059) 
1990 1.987 0.301 0.952 0.557 0.813 -0.017 0.942 0.700 
  (0.133) (0.026) (0.051) (0.029) (0.279) (0.194) (0.045) (0.026) 
2000 1.637 0.688 1.296 0.621 0.922 0.349 1.380 0.336 
  (0.128) (0.023) (0.073) (0.027) (0.358) (0.132) (0.075) (0.022) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis and are calculated using the delta-method. The MRS can be 
interpreted as the number of units of a characteristic an individual is willing to give up to obtain an 
additional unit of flexibility. 
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Table 1.11: Alternative Measures of Flexibility- Women       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Flexible Schedule 
  
0.406 0.554 0.350 0.376 
  
   
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
































Part Time Flexibility 
     
1.125 
  
      
(0.093) 
Real Weekly Wages 1.755 1.490 1.684 1.651 1.366 1.582 1.653 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
Safe Conditions 1.146 1.207 1.160 0.981 0.989 1.011 0.988 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
OJT -0.154 -0.144 -0.178 -0.147 -0.130 -0.168 -0.185 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unstructuredness 0.544 0.512 0.503 0.303 0.323 0.247 0.225 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Assisting or Caring 
for Others -0.066 -0.013 -0.068 -0.092 -0.049 -0.089 -0.084 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Competitiveness -0.232 -0.184 -0.225 -0.206 -0.152 -0.217 -0.217 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1980 -0.548 -0.603 -0.515 -0.556 -0.624 -0.519 -0.499 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1990 -0.029 -0.039 -0.002 -0.037 -0.050 -0.004 0.025 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -5.203 -2.895 -4.320 -3.934 -1.718 -2.889 -2.973 
  (0.051) (0.057) (0.048) (0.053) (0.060) (0.049) (0.073) 
Note: The standard deviation of hours is calculated within occupations measuring the variability of 





Table 1.12: Alternative Measures of Flexibility- Men       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Flexible Schedule 
  
0.987 0.783 0.906 0.817 
  
   
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
































Part Time Flexibility 
     
-5.870 
  
      
(0.124) 
Real Weekly Wages 2.475 1.666 2.345 2.365 1.638 2.261 1.554 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Safe Conditions 0.590 0.859 0.615 0.408 0.640 0.441 0.697 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
OJT -0.191 -0.210 -0.223 -0.186 -0.191 -0.206 -0.157 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unstructuredness 0.610 0.339 0.511 0.236 0.088 0.158 0.110 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Assisting or Caring 
for Others -0.335 -0.276 -0.337 -0.321 -0.293 -0.319 -0.279 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Competitiveness 0.115 0.130 0.127 0.144 0.136 0.141 0.160 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
1980 0.401 0.462 0.470 0.378 0.418 0.428 0.354 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
1990 0.235 0.273 0.287 0.231 0.255 0.271 0.218 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -11.586 -4.304 -9.959 -9.866 -3.535 -8.450 -3.355 
  (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.053) 
Note: The standard deviation of hours is calculated within occupations measuring the variability of 








Flexible Scheduling 0.550 1.234 
  (0.010) (0.007) 
Real Weekly Wages 1.807 1.602 
  (0.011) (0.008) 
Flexibility to Work PT 1.630 -3.779 
  (0.026) (0.031) 
Safe Conditions 0.889 0.518 
  (0.004) (0.003) 
OJT -0.143 -0.122 
  (0.003) (0.002) 
Unstructuredness 0.316 0.237 
  (0.007) (0.005) 
Assisting or Caring for 
Others -0.075 -0.208 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Competitiveness -0.165 0.236 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
1980 -0.586 0.192 
  (0.006) (0.004) 
1990 -0.028 0.151 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant -4.820 -3.994 




Table 1.14 Estimated MRS Between Flexibility 
and Job Attributes 
  Women Men 
Real Weekly Wages 0.300 0.775 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Flexibility to Work PT 0.336 -0.311 
  (0.008) (0.003) 
Safe Conditions 0.602 2.244 
  (0.012) (0.019) 
OJT -3.685 -9.775 
  (0.110) (0.190) 
Unstructuredness 1.679 4.676 
  (0.049) (0.103) 
Assisting or Caring for 
Others -7.206 -6.006 
  (0.249) (0.066) 
Competitiveness -3.099 5.332 




Table 1.15: Occupational Choice By Demographic Group with Part Time Flexibility Measure 




















Scheduling 0.641 0.504 0.550 0.277 1.326 1.401 0.978 0.904 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.046) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.082) 
Real Weekly  2.188 1.351 1.946 1.171 1.923 1.227 1.831 1.113 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.047) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.086) 
Flexibility to 
Work PT 1.616 1.462 1.804 1.171 -3.910 -6.575 -1.361 -3.773 
  (0.051) (0.048) (0.040) (0.118) (0.068) (0.057) (0.045) (0.343) 
Safe Conditions 0.873 0.986 0.843 0.840 0.525 0.568 0.484 0.391 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.020) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.029) 
OJT -0.196 -0.058 -0.174 -0.066 -0.167 -0.041 -0.195 -0.102 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.026) 
Unstructurednes
s 0.328 0.380 0.265 0.301 0.159 0.483 0.032 0.097 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.030) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.057) 
Assisting or 
Caring for 
Others -0.107 -0.014 -0.098 -0.046 -0.232 -0.123 -0.290 -0.223 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) 
Competitiveness -0.209 -0.169 -0.147 -0.088 0.219 0.280 0.198 0.361 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.043) 
1980 -0.379 -0.921 -0.487 -0.797 0.238 0.426 -0.102 -0.589 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.026) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.045) 
1990 0.100 -0.139 0.008 -0.395 0.188 0.237 0.058 -0.423 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.022) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.041) 
Constant -8.575 -3.322 -6.525 -3.763 -7.190 -3.685 -5.394 -5.032 




Table 1.16: MRS Between Flexibility and Other Characteristics by Demographic Group   





















Wages 0.289 0.369 0.278 0.231 0.693 1.160 0.533 0.817 
  (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.041) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.099) 
Flexibility to 
Work PT 0.395 0.344 0.303 0.235 -0.322 -0.205 -0.663 -0.231 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.048) (0.007) (0.002) (0.022) (0.029) 
Safe Conditions -0.713 -0.501 -0.632 -0.316 -2.368 -2.326 -1.910 -2.200 
  (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.055) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.270) 
OJT -3.176 -8.230 -3.029 -3.990 -7.742 -32.626 -4.855 -8.546 
  (0.142) (0.972) (0.128) (1.208) (0.238) (2.703) (0.119) (2.285) 
Unstructuredness 1.886 1.290 1.983 0.871 7.153 2.715 19.079 7.956 
  (0.098) (0.070) (0.101) (0.184) (0.448) (0.055) (3.190) (4.203) 
Assisting or 
Caring for Others -5.941 -35.284 -5.465 -6.111 -5.798 -11.828 -3.371 -4.069 
  (0.298) (10.389) (0.249) (1.767) (0.122) (0.299) (0.059) (0.548) 
Competitiveness -2.882 -2.851 -3.403 -2.924 6.190 5.117 4.984 2.501 




Table 1.17: Occupational Choice Full Time Part Time Decision 
Embedded 
  Women Men 
Flexible Schedules 0.576 1.291 
  (0.008) (0.006) 
Part Time -1.677 -2.917 
  (0.009) (0.011) 
Part Time Flexibility 0.549 -4.502 
  (0.024) (0.026) 
Real Weekly Wages 1.720 1.627 
  (0.009) (0.007) 
Safe Conditions 0.939 0.551 
  (0.004) (0.002) 
OJT -0.127 -0.121 
  (0.003) (0.002) 
Unstructuredness 0.365 0.226 
  (0.006) (0.004) 
Assisting or Caring for Others -0.092 -0.202 
  (0.002) (0.001) 
Competitiveness -0.150 0.243 
  (0.004) (0.003) 
1980 -0.626 0.256 
  (0.005) (0.003) 
1990 -0.033 0.194 
  (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -4.431 -4.158 
  (0.055) (0.043) 
Note: Individuals choose both occupation and to work part time or 




Table 1.18: Occupational Choice Model FT PT Decision Embedded by Skill 










Flexible Schedules 0.315 0.583 1.136 1.112 
  (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) 
Part Time -1.040 -2.002 -2.484 -3.109 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) 
Part Time Flexibility 2.876 -1.205 1.301 -9.316 
  (0.029) (0.043) (0.034) (0.041) 
Real Weekly Wages 2.860 1.011 3.946 0.726 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) 
Safe Conditions 0.997 1.042 0.391 0.656 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
OJT -0.072 -0.102 -0.608 0.020 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Unstructuredness 0.117 0.102 -0.277 0.122 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
Assisting or Caring for 
Others 0.140 -0.077 -0.492 -0.109 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Competitiveness -0.127 -0.045 0.568 0.278 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
1980 -0.419 -0.759 0.606 0.087 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) 
1990 0.088 -0.125 0.411 0.040 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Constant -12.143 1.487 -18.624 2.588 
  (0.092) (0.074) (0.081) (0.051) 
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Equation Section 2CHAPTER TWOEquation Section 2
THE IMPLICIT PRICE OF FLEXIBLE SCHEDLES: A HEDONIC WAGE ANALYSIS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, the preferences of individuals were estimated using a random utility 
model of occupational choice.  The estimates revealed that men had a relatively stronger 
preference for schedule flexibility than women, while women had a greater preference for 
jobs offering greater availability of part-time employment – even if the women, in fact, 
worked full time. These findings are not entirely surprising. Men, who tend to work full 
time, may place a relatively high value on being able to manipulate their start and stop 
times at work, holding constant their full time work schedule. By contrast, women may 
have relatively higher demands for large blocks of time to devote to home production, 
including, possibly, the raising of children.  
Nonetheless, one would naturally like to have some check on these findings. An 
alternative way to estimate men’s and women’s preference parameters is via a hedonic 
wage regression. Of course, one would ideally obtain the same estimated parameters 
regardless of the way in which the model is estimated. However, there are reasons why 
these estimates could, in fact differ. For example, a key maintained hypothesis in the 
random utility model is that of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIR).  Imposing 
IIR on the data when it is inappropriate could lead to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates 
I estimate the value individuals place on scheduling flexibility using a hedonic 
wage model. Flexible work schedules have two simultaneous effects on wages; flexible 
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work schedules is an amenity that workers are willing to sacrifice wages to obtain and 
thus workers would be willing to pay to obtain flexible work schedules. Flexible work 
schedules may also be productivity enhancing, see Landauer (1997), leading to increased 
wages since workers are paid their marginal products in a competitive labor market. 
Weeden (2003) estimates the effects of flexible schedules and locations on wages. 
She defines flexible work arrangements as is there a corporate policy which allows 
employees to vary the timing of their work days. She finds a wage premium for flexible 
work arrangements of 6-11% depending on the specification. She finds similar results for 
flexible location as well, in which an employee has the ability to work from various 
locations rather than one office location. Winder (2009) estimates the model from 
Weeden’s paper controlling for firm characteristics. She finds that this reduces the wage 
premium found by Weeden by approximately one-third. 
In this chapter I investigate the marginal willingness to pay for flexible work 
arrangements, specifically schedule flexibility, using a hedonic wage framework. I find 
that the marginal willingness to pay is higher for college educated men relative to 
women. These results are consistent with the results I find in the random utility model. 
 By investigating the relationship between wages and flexible work schedules I 
will be able to identify the shape of the hedonic wage function. In the next section I will 
discuss the theoretical framework of the hedonic wage function, including the supply and 
demand framework. In section 3 I discuss the identification issues that arise under the 
hedonic model and possible solutions to the endogeneity issue. In section 4 I estimate the 
various models and discuss the results. I finally conclude in section 5. 
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2.2 THEORY 
Rosen (1974) was one of the first to discuss the hedonic wage model in which 
workers will sort into different firms based on their preferences and the cost of the firm to 
provide the amenity. The hedonic model is often used to express the trade-offs between 
wages and risk that are made to induce workers to accept more risk on the job. Here I will 
discuss the tradeoff that must be made between wages and flexibility. I assume that 
flexibility is costly to the firm and that workers must accept lower wages in order to gain 
greater flexibility. 
Firms maximize profits by choosing the amount of capital, labor, and flexibility 
that they will employ. Programs to improve flexibility for workers are costly to 
employers but also provide benefits including lower pay for workers and lower 
absenteeism.
17
 Following Kniesner and Leeth (2010) firms maximize profits: 
 max ( , , ( ); ) ( ) k eR n k E flex W flex n p k p flex                                      (2.1) 
where, 
 
            profit,
        R( )  revenue,
           n  number of workers,
           k  quantity of capital,
       flex  quantity of flexibility provided 






  production of output,
 W(flex)  the market wage function, and
         p   unit price of capital.





                                                 
17
 See Landauer (1997) 
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Labor, capital, and flexibility increase revenue at decreasing rates, and all cross 
derivatives are positive. Under perfect competition firms will increase their use of labor 
and capital until the marginal revenue product equals its marginal cost. Firms will 
increase flexibility until the marginal benefits (lower wages) equals the marginal cost of 
implementing the program. Since firms have different costs of implementing flexible 
schedules the optimal level of flexibility will vary across firms. Firms with low costs of 
implementing flexible schedules will provide greater flexibility than firms with high 
costs. 
 Figure 2.1 shows the isoprofit curves of two firms. The isoprofit curve shows the 
tradeoff between wages and flexibility holding constant profit and employing the optimal 
quantities of labor and capital. In order to keep profits constant wages must fall as the 
flexibility increases and firms with high costs of providing flexibility will need greater 
reductions in wages to keep profits constant compared to a low cost provider of 
flexibility. Firm A maximizes profits by offering workers flexibility equal to fa where the 
firm’s isoprofit curve is tangent to the market wage function. Firm B has lower costs of 
providing flexibility than firm A and will maximize profits by providing flexibility equal 
to fb and lower wages. If there are sufficiently large number of firms then each point on 
the hedonic wage function represents a tangency for some company. 
 Workers similarly face a maximization problem. Workers maximize utility  
 ( , )u U c flex        (2.2) 
where c is consumption. Assuming no outside income ( )c W flex . Through substitution 








    (2.3) 
The right hand side can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of increased flexibility 
which is the direct gain in utility. The left hand side of equation (2.3) can be interpreted 
as the marginal cost, which is the loss of wages and lower consumption. Because 
preferences differ among individuals the optimal amount of flexibility will vary. Workers 
with a high desire for flexibility will sort into jobs with high levels of flexibility and 
workers a mild taste for flexibility will sort into jobs with low flexibility.  
 Figure 2.2 shows worker’s indifference curves which show the tradeoff between 
wages and flexibility that workers must make. Workers maximize their utility when their 
indifference curve is tangent to the market wage function. Worker C has a high marginal 
rate of substitution between flexibility and wages so that he chooses a job with low 
flexibility and higher wages; this person has only mild interest in flexibility. However 
worker D has a stronger desire for flexibility and is willing to accept lower wages to 
maximize her utility. 
 The hedonic wage function measures the supply and demand of labor across the 
flexibility spectrum. A shortage of workers in inflexible jobs will drive wages up causing 
some workers to leave flexible jobs while some firms will implement policy that promote 
flexibility in order to reduce wage costs. The slope of the hedonic wage function 
measures the willingness of workers to obtain flexibility while sacrificing wages; this 
provides an estimate of workers’ willingness to pay for flexibility. Simultaneously 
hedonic wage function measures the reduction in wages that firms must pay to increase 
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flexibility in the work place. The hedonic wage function can be seen in Figure 2.3 where 
it maps out a set of tangencies between isoprofit curves and indifference curves. 
2.3 IDENTIFICATION ISSUES 
           Rosen (1974) proposed a method to estimate the consumers’ marginal willingness 
to pay (MWTP) for a particular characteristic of a good; in this case workers are paying 
for scheduling flexibility on the job through decreased wages. Rosen’s method provided a 
theoretical framework for the hedonic regression which could recover the MWTP 
through a two-stage approach. The two-stage procedure uses variation in implicit prices, 
obtained through geographically distinct markets, to identify the MWTP function.
18
 
           Rosen’s hedonic model has become a popular method for valuating job 
characteristics such as risk despite econometric problems. Bartik (1987), Bishop and 
Timmins (2011) discuss these problems. A source of endogeneity that is difficult to over 
using exclusion restrictions is that the implicit price of flexibility varies systematically 
with the quantity consumed, unless one assumes that the hedonic wage function is linear. 
Typically MWTP is only estimated rather than trying to recover the hedonic wage 
function. 
 Here I outline the endogeneity issue, unobserved preferences affect both the 
quantity of flexibility consumed and the price of flexibility. Consider Bartik’s (1987) 
example that stresses the sorting that will naturally occur. Suppose housing units owned 
by carpenters will be better maintained. Households with greater desire for well-
maintained housing will choose carpenter landlords, without knowing their landlord’s 
                                                 
18
 Alternatively, one could allow for the hedonic price function to be non-linear to identify the MWTP 
function. 
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occupation. The endogeneity problem emphasized here will causes the instruments, 
supplier traits- that is occupational attributes- to produces biased results of the MWTP 
function. 
 Formally, the endogeneity problem is outlined for concreteness which is based on 
Epple’s (1987) model. Consider a quadratic hedonic wage function given by 
 
22
0 1 3( ; ) ,
2
j j j jW flex flex flex Z

        (2.4) 
where, j indexes occupations, Wj measures the wage of occupation j with occupational 
attributes Zj and occupational flexibility flexj. The linear wage gradient associated with 
the hedonic wage function is: 
 1 2
( ; )













where, '( ; )jW flex   denotes the implicit price of schedule flexibility. 
 Continueing, Rosen’s methodology the coefficients of demand (MWTP) and 
supply (marginal willingness to accept) functions for scheduling flexibility are sought to 
be recovered from the equilibrium relationship: 
 1 2'( ; )
d d d d
j j j jW flex flex X         (2.6) 
and 
 1 2'( ; ) ,
s s s s





jX  represent characteristics of workers and firms in occupation j 
respectively. And x and y represent unobserved idiosyncratic shocks to preferences for 
workers and marginal costs for firms. 
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 The problem that is faced here is that djflex  is correlated with 
d
j  because of the 
sorting of workers and firms. That is workers with the highest MWTP will sort into firms 
with the lowest marginal cost of providing schedule flexibility. This can be seen by 
noting that s dj jflex flex  in equilibrium and substituting equation (2.5) into (2.6) and 





[( ) ].d dj j jflex X   
 
   

 (2.8) 
Equation (2.8) makes it clear that schedule flexibility will be correlated with dj .  
 Traditionally, equation (2.6) will be estimated using instrumental variables with 
the typical instrument being supply function shifters. This solution is not available in the 
present case because suppliers are heterogeneous and workers and firms will sort. That is 
d
j  will determine the firm that an individual will work for and so 
s
jX  cannot be used as 
an instrument for djflex . 
 Various authors have proposed alternative instruments to deal with this 
endogeneity problem. Bartik (1987) suggests using market indicator variables as 
instruments. In order to introduce exogeneity into the model, Kahn and Lang (1988) 
suggest that the market indicators should be interacted with individual’s demographic 
characteristics such as gender or marital status. The idea is that there will be a source of 
exogenous variation among firms across markets and thus there will be exogenous 
variation in the equilibrium quantity of schedule flexibility chosen among individuals. 
However these instruments require strong assumptions regarding preferences across 
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markets and the instruments may not induce sufficient variation in the work amenity 
(Bishop and Timmins 2011).  
 I assume that preferences for schedule flexibility are homogenous across markets 
and that these markets will induce sufficient variation to identify the marginal willingness 
to pay for flexibility.  When choosing an occupation individuals take the implicit price of 
schedule flexibility as given and choose the amount of flexibility to consume that 
maximize their utility based on their preferences. Preferences are determined by a vector 
of observed characteristics djX  and unobserved taste shifters 
d
j . These assumptions lead 
to typical econometric model where schedule flexibility is endogenous and is a function 
of exogenous variables djX , and finally 
d
j  is the residual. 
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where k indexes geographic market.
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 Markets are defined by four Census regions, North, South, Midwest, and West. 
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Ii represents household income and the first order condition for schedule flexibility 
becomes 
 1 2 3 1 2 0.
d d
k ik j i ik k k ikflex X flex            (2.12) 
Before the marginal willing to pay can be estimated the implicit price of schedule 
flexibility must be estimated using equation (2.9) to calculate (2.10). The MWTP can be 
identified in the second stage regression of  
 1 2 1 2 3( ) .
d d
k k ik k ik k i ikflex flex X           (2.13) 
The resulting estimated MWTP will biased due to the sorting process that will naturally 
occur between those with the greatest demand for flexibility and firms with the lowest 
cost of providing scheduling flexibility. 
2.4 DATA 
 I use the Current Population Survey Work Schedule Supplement for the years 
1985, 1991, 1997, 2001, and 2004 to estimate the hedonic wage function using Rosen’s 
methodology.
20
 The data are further merged with occupational descriptors from the 
Occupational Information Network (O*Net) using the methodology from Chapter 1.
21
 I 
now use individual level data to estimate the implicit price of schedule flexibility.  
 The sample is restricted to individuals between the ages of 25 and 65 and 
working.
22
 The data include typical demographic data including, gender, marital status, 
age, and wages. Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample and by 
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 These are all of the CPS supplements that include information on flexible schedules. 
21
 For a description of the O*Net data see the Data Section in Chapter 1. 
22
 This is a departure from chapter 1 in which I examined only young workers ages 25-35. I do this in order 
to expand the sample size since I am working with CPS Work Schedule Supplement which is a relatively 
small data set compared to the Census.  
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gender. Men and women are represented in roughly equally across the country and have 
equal access to flexible jobs. However 43% of men are college graduates while only 33% 
of women this likely contributes to the wage gap in which men earn over $300 more 
week than women do on average. 
Further the sample is restricted to workers who are employed for at least 39 weeks 
throughout the year. This reduces the likely that workers are observed in temporary jobs 
in which they are willing to deal with less than optimal job packages in order to find the a 
better match. I also restrict the sample to those working in non-military jobs.  
 Because not all individuals will be able to choose all jobs I divide the sample by 
high and low skilled occupations in an attempt to control for this selection problem.
23
 
High skilled occupations are defined as occupations that utilize higher than median levels 
of mathematical reasoning and inductive reasoning. The real weekly wage gap between 
high and low skilled occupations is approximately $260 per week. The hourly wage gap 
is approximately $5 per hour. High and low skilled occupations are distributed roughly 
equally across the four regions.  
 High skilled occupations are four percentage points more likely to have access to 
flexible schedules relative to low skilled occupations. This could be correlated with 
workers’ ability in that workers with higher skills can be trusted with more independence. 
Table 2.3 shows the correlation be schedule flexibility and various occupational 
attributes. Notice that there is strong positive correlation between schedule flexibility and 
occupational attributes. In order to account for the matching problem based on skill I 
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 One way to control for selection in to occupations would be to look at a single occupation such as 
doctors. However there are a limited number of individuals in each occupation 
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isolate high skilled occupations and low skilled occupations and separately estimate the 
marginal willingness to pay for schedule flexibility. 
2.5 RESULTS 
 In the first stage of my estimation I recover the market hedonic wage function; 
these estimates are then used to in the second stage to recover the linear marginal 
willingness to pay function which varies for men and women. Thesecond stage estimates 
the hedonic wage function. From the hedonic wage function the MWTP can be calculated 
for men and women. I first analyze the full data set using both real weekly wages and real 
hourly wages as the dependent variable. It may be the case that not all college graduates 
have the same set of occupations to choose from, in order to account for this I estimate 
the MWTP separately for workers in high and low skilled occupations.  
A. Pooled Data 
 I first estimate equation (2.9), the hedonic wage gradient for individuals in all 
occupations; the results can be found in Table 2.4. I estimate equation (2.9) using both 
the log real weekly wages and log real hourly wages as the dependent variable. The 
implicit prices of occupational characteristics on wages are estimated by region. The sign 
on schedule flexibility interacted with the various region is of the expected sign and are 
associated with higher wages.  
 Using these results, the implicit price of schedule flexibility is calculated for each 
region using equation (2.10). The implicit price of schedule flexibility is then used as the 
dependent variable for equation (2.14) and the results can be found in Table 2.5. The 
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estimated coefficients vary by sign between specifications when the real weekly wage 
and the real hourly wage are used to calculate the implicit price.
24
  
The MWTP for men and women is displayed in Table 2.6. The estimated MWTP 
for men is -0.021 and women is -0.10 for real weekly wages. Under the first specification 
measuring wages in weekly terms, men are willing to pay two percent of their wages to 
obtain flexible hours while women are willing to sacrifice one percent of their wages to 
obtain flexible hours. This implies that men’s MWTP for schedule flexibility is greater 
than women’s.  
For MWTP in terms of the real hourly wages, men must be compensated 4.5 of 
their wages and women 0.1 percent. However the standard error on women’s MWTP is 
large and the null hypothesis that MWTP is significantly different from zero cannot be 
rejected; but men’s MWTP is significantly different from zero. This implies that there is 
productivity gain for men but not women, as men are compensated for having flexible 
schedules whereas women pay a premium to obtain schedule flexibility.
25
  
The marginal willingness to pay for schedule flexibility differs depending upon 
the specification of real weekly wages or real hourly wages. This suggests that the 
number of hours worked per week effects the MWTP. Because the availability of flexible 
schedules are correlated with hours worked per week, real hourly wages better estimate 
the MWTP for individuals, (Golden 2001). These effects could be further compounded 
by selection into low and high skilled occupations. 
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 The preferred specification is using real hourly wages as one does not need to worry about labor supply 
effects when looking at weekly wages.  
25
 Alternatively, flexible schedules could be an undesirable characteristic of the job for men. However this 
would not be consistent with the occupational choice results from Chapter 1 which show that schedule 
flexibility increases utility for both men and women. 
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B. High and Low Skilled Occupations 
 Estimates of the preference parameters could be biased and inconsistent if not all 
college graduates are able to choose from jobs in each and every occupation. Workers of 
course want the highest paying job with excellent amenities but these jobs are not 
available to all workers. Consider NBA players many high school and college players 
aspire to play basketball professional and earn millions of dollars to play the game they 
love, but only a few elite players will have this opportunity. This shows that not all 
individuals have the same opportunities available to them and assuming that they do 
could lead to biased results.  To examine the sensitivity of the estimates to this 
assumption, I divided the occupations into two broad skill groups, with highly skilled 
occupations defined as those that use above-average levels of mathematical reasoning 
and inductive reasoning, and less-skilled occupations those that use average or below-
average levels in at least one of those facilities. High skilled workers are more likely to 
have access to flexible schedules and place a different value on the amenity that low 
skilled workers value differently. 
 I estimate the two stage hedonic wage model using both real weekly wages and 
real hourly wages for each occupation skill group. In Table 2.7 the estimated wage 
gradient is estimated for high and low skilled occupations using real hourly wages as the 
dependent variable. For workers in high skilled occupations, schedule flexibility varies 
positively with wages in each region at a decreasing rate, but for low skilled occupations 
there is a wage penalty associated with schedule flexibility for each region.  
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Table 2.8 reports the estimated hedonic wage function for both high and low 
skilled occupations. For workers in low skilled occupations schedule flexibility increases 
the wage premium that workers must be compensated with to accept the amenity. 
However this is offset for women by the interaction term between the female indicator 
variable and schedule flexibility which is negative. The MWTP will be used to better 
identify how workers value schedule flexibility in both high skilled and low skilled 
occupations. 
I report the marginal willingness to pay for schedule flexibility in Table 2.9 by 
gender for high and low skilled occupations. The MWTP is of the predicted sign, 
negative, for women and men in high skilled occupations; these groups are willing to 
sacrifice 6.5% to 23% of wages in exchange for schedule flexibility. Workers in high 
skilled occupations are likely to have a greater willingness to pay due to income effects, 
in which they are more willing to give up wages when earning more money. But for men 
in low skilled occupations the sign of the MWTP is positive but not statistically different 
from zero, implies that men in low skilled occupations must be compensated to accept 
jobs with flexible schedules. This could be caused by the fact that men in low skilled 
occupations do not like flexible schedules and so they must be compensated to put up 
with it. If this were the case men in low skilled occupations would not have to take 
advantage of the policy. It seems more likely that the effect is small and negative that is 
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The real hourly wage specification has a similar estimated wage gradient (Table 
2.10) and hedonic wage function (Table 2.11) as the real weekly wage. The signs of the 
hedonic wage function are the same as the real hourly wage specification. The estimated 
MWTP can be found in Table 2.12. Again similar patterns are found for MWTP using 
real weekly wages. The MWTP for women in low skilled occupations is 3.7% of wages 
and 22% for women in high skilled occupations. The MWTP for men in high skilled 
occupations is 47%; but again men in low skilled occupations would need to be 




 The hedonic wage model estimates how workers value scheduling flexibility 
which is a mechanism that allows individuals to more easily balance home and work 
lives. Flexibility has increasingly become commonplace in the workplace and important 
for firms to offer as part of compensation packages. It is important for human resources 
to know how to estimate the value of compensation packages when schedule flexibility is 
included. The hedonic wage model allows this to be done.  
The results suggest that men and women value schedule flexibility differently and 
that workers in high and low skilled occupations value flexibility differently. Looking at 
men and women aggregated by occupational skill level there is little difference between 
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 Combine the large standard errors with the fact that the results might be biased and it is plausible to 
believe that men in low skilled occupations are willing to sacrifice wages for schedule flexibility.  
27
 The MWTP for men in high skilled occupations seems implausibly high. The hedonic wage model has 
not dealt with the endogeneity issue that is at hand here and is likely yielding biased estimates.   
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the value men and women place on flexibility due the relatively large size of the standard 
errors on the estimated marginal willingness to pay. Women are willing to sacrifice 
approximately 1% of wages to obtain flexibility and men are willing to sacrifice 2% of 
wages.  
 The difference between men and women becomes starker when examining 
differences in occupational skill level. There is the peculiar result that men in low skilled 
occupations must be compensated to take on flexible schedules. In theory workers need 
not be compensated for schedule flexibility because if it is undesired characteristics 
workers do not to utilize the flexibility and thus would be unwilling to sacrifice wages. 
Men in high skilled occupations value schedule flexibility more than women. These 
results are consistent with the results from the occupational choice model which also 





Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics by Gender 
  
Full 
Sample Women Men 
Real Weekly 
Wages 742.827 526.781 899.316 
  (449.709) (328.603) (460.702) 
Real Hourly 
Wages 18.196  14.446  20.912  
  (10.238) (8.219) (10.689) 
Schedule 
Flexibility 0.234 0.243 0.228 
  (0.424) (0.429) (0.420) 
Northeast Region 0.227 0.226 0.228 
  (0.419) (0.419) (0.419) 
South Region 0.237 0.231 0.241 
  (0.425) (0.422) (0.428) 
Midwest Region 0.263 0.273 0.256 
  (0.440) (0.446) (0.437) 
West Region 0.273 0.269 0.275 
  (0.445) (0.444) (0.447) 
Female 0.420 - - 
  (0.494) 
 
  
Married 0.676 0.612 0.722 
  (0.468) (0.487) (0.448) 
Age 38.678 37.829 39.293 




Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Occupational Skill 
  Low Skilled Occupation High Skilled Occupation 
Real Weekly Wages 574.563 834.808 
  (377.570) (459.305) 
Real Hourly Wages 14.877 20.010 
  (8.867) (10.480) 
Schedule Flexibility 0.208 0.249 
  (0.406) (0.432) 
Northeast Region 0.210 0.237 
  (0.407) (0.425) 
South Region 0.241 0.235 
  (0.428) (0.424) 
Midwest Region 0.265 0.263 
  (0.441) (0.440) 
West Region 0.285 0.266 
  (0.451) (0.442) 
Female 0.459 0.399 
  (0.498) (0.490) 
Married 0.656 0.687 
  (0.475) (0.464) 
Age 38.154 38.964 
  (9.893) (9.681) 
Note: High skilled occupations are defined has requiring higher than median levels of 
mathematical reasoning and inductive reasoning. 
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Table 2.3: Correlation of Scheduling 
Flexibility with Various Occupational 
Characteristics 
  Flexibility 
Physical Safety 0.110 
Human Capital Accumulation -0.001 
Self-Directed 0.188 
Attending to Others 0.013 
Workplace Competitiveness 0.036 
Responsibility for Outcome 0.065 
Frequency of Decision Making 0.227 
Writing Skills 0.512 
Speaking Skills 0.512 
Monitoring Ability 0.422 
Negotiation Skills 0.506 
Instructing Others 0.384 
Critical Thinking 0.521 




Table 2.4: Estimated Wage Gradient         
  Log Real Weekly Wages Log Real Hourly Wages 
  Northeast Midwest South  West Northeast Midwest South  West 
Flexibility*Region 1.299 1.116 2.023 1.316 1.729 1.279 2.426 1.417 
  (0.546) (0.524) (0.519) (0.531) (0.440) (0.422) (0.418) (0.427) 
Flexibility2*Region -0.288 -0.389 -1.132 -0.596 -1.107 -1.077 -1.960 -0.844 
  (0.744) (0.734) (0.712) (0.749) (0.599) (0.591) (0.573) (0.602) 
Region Dummy 
 
1.050 0.331 0.743 
 
0.600 0.055 0.361 
  
 
(0.286) (0.276) (0.277) 
 
(0.230) (0.222) (0.223) 
Physical Safety on 
the Job 
0.104 0.133 0.165 0.113 0.048 0.052 0.095 0.071 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Human Capital 
Accumulation 
0.204 0.181 0.140 0.231 0.169 0.142 0.115 0.163 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) 
Self-Directed 0.531 0.260 0.378 0.386 0.277 0.139 0.206 0.223 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039) 
Attending to 
Others 
-0.007 -0.021 -0.011 -0.003 0.017 -0.005 0.001 0.011 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Workplace 
Competitiveness 
0.140 0.172 0.175 0.088 0.065 0.102 0.088 0.034 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 3.215 








Table 2.5: Hedonic Wage Function 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Log Real Weekly 
Wages 
Log Real Hourly 
Wages 
Schedule 
Flexibility -0.021 0.045 
  (0.014) (0.019) 
Female -0.017 -0.011 
  (0.010) (0.014) 
Female*Flexible 0.027 -0.033 
  (0.021) (0.029) 
Married 0.013 -0.011 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
Age 0.001 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
1985 -0.062 -0.066 
  (0.026) (0.036) 
1991 -0.037 -0.054 
  (0.026) (0.036) 
2001 -0.016 0.000 
  (0.032) (0.045) 
2004 -0.036 -0.032 
  (0.045) (0.062) 
Constant 0.234 -0.776 




Table 2.6: Marginal Willingness to Pay 
  
Log Real Weekly 
Wages 
Log Real Hour 
Wages 
Women -0.010 0.001 
  (.021) (.029)  
Men -0.021 0.045 




Table 2.7: Estimated Wage Gradient Real Hourly Wages     
  Low Skilled Occupations High Skilled Occupations 
  Northeast Midwest South  West Northeast Midwest South  West 
Flexibility*Region -0.219 -0.223 1.286 -0.244 2.132 1.502 2.050 2.789 
  (0.599) (0.558) (0.562) (0.555) (0.716) (0.736) (0.687) (0.764) 
Flexibility2*Region 1.077 0.224 -0.594 1.350 -1.236 -0.758 -1.198 -2.683 
  (0.833) (0.786) (0.776) (0.789) (0.968) (1.031) (0.950) (1.081) 





(0.327) (0.318) (0.317) (0.464) 
 
(0.440) (0.453) 
Physical Safety on 
the Job 
-0.046 0.013 0.034 0.080 0.139 0.084 0.148 0.078 
  (0.034) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) 
Human Capital 
Accumulation 
0.215 0.166 0.176 0.145 0.136 0.108 0.037 0.123 
  (0.057) (0.052) (0.052) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
Self-Directed 0.164 0.117 0.129 0.178 0.267 0.085 0.130 0.071 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.053) (0.052) (0.080) (0.079) (0.074) (0.079) 
Attending to 
Others 
-0.020 -0.055 -0.060 -0.021 0.011 0.029 0.023 0.038 
  (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Workplace 
Competitiveness 
0.131 0.071 0.085 0.025 0.025 0.110 0.094 0.062 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Constant 1.551 

















Flexibility 0.058 -0.227 
  (0.076) (0.049) 
Female 0.018 -0.034 
  (0.051) (0.039) 
Female*Flexible -0.140 0.159 
  (0.110) (0.076) 
Married -0.060 0.084 
  (0.047) (0.036) 
Age 0.002 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
1985 -0.251 0.083 
  (0.110) (0.189) 
1991 -0.206 0.137 







2001 0.038 0.195 
  (0.141) (0.204) 
2004 -0.295 
   (0.177) 
 Constant 1.367 -0.843 
  (0.144) (0.206) 
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Women -0.065 -0.103 
  (0.086) (0.089) 
Men 0.058 -0.227 
  (0.076) (0.049) 
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Table 2.10: Estimated Wage Gradient Real Weekly Wages   
  Low Skilled Occupations High Skilled Occupations 
  Northeast Midwest South  West Northeast Midwest South  West 
Flexibility*Region -1.853 -1.228 -0.360 -2.093 1.999 1.848 2.559 4.107 
  (0.820) (0.765) (0.770) (0.760) (0.818) (0.840) (0.784) (0.873) 
Flexibility2*Region 3.543 2.100 1.955 4.056 -0.758 -0.801 -1.534 -4.380 
  (1.141) (1.076) (1.063) (1.080) (1.105) (1.178) (1.085) (1.234) 





(0.447) (0.436) (0.434) (0.530) 
 
(0.502) (0.517) 
Physical Safety on 
the Job 
0.001 0.086 0.090 0.114 0.202 0.171 0.223 0.130 
  (0.047) (0.041) (0.040) (0.035) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) 
Human Capital 
Accumulation 
0.236 0.236 0.205 0.235 0.151 0.112 0.047 0.147 
  (0.077) (0.071) (0.071) (0.057) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040) 
Self-Directed 0.350 0.183 0.254 0.265 0.437 0.183 0.272 0.171 
  (0.084) (0.079) (0.073) (0.071) (0.091) (0.091) (0.085) (0.090) 
Attending to 
Others 
-0.072 -0.106 -0.110 -0.077 0.000 0.032 0.031 0.048 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Workplace 
Competitiveness 
0.220 0.096 0.187 0.112 0.096 0.216 0.180 0.110 
  (0.061) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) 
Constant 4.358 

















Flexibility 0.079 -0.477 
  (0.090) (0.099) 
Female 0.035 -0.095 
  (0.060) (0.079) 
Female*Flexible -0.151 0.355 
  (0.131) (0.155) 
Married -0.094 0.166 
  (0.056) (0.072) 
Age 0.000 -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
1985 -0.278 0.164 
  (0.131) (0.384) 
1991 -0.242 0.291 







2001 0.066 0.415 
  (0.168) (0.414) 
2004 -0.372   
  (0.210)   
Constant 4.732 -1.191 











Women -0.037 -0.218 
  (0.124)  (0.159) 
Men 0.079 -0.477 


















































Equation Section 3WORKING SPOUSES AND FLEXIBILITYEquation Section 3
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters I found that men have a stronger demand for schedule 
flexibility than women. One mechanism that may have led to the increase demand for 
flexible schedules is the increase in female labor force participation. The increase in 
demand for flexible schedules for women is over 20% and for men approximately 35% 
between 1980 and 2000. It may be the case that men who’s wives work are more likely to 
choose a flexible job in order to better share the at-home responsibilities. Flexible 
schedules are a mechanism in which individuals can adjust their work schedules in order 
to meet personal needs. If both spouses are working the need to adjust work schedules 
becomes relatively more important. 
 I find that having a working spouse increase the likelihood of working men 
choosing a flexible job. Depending on the specification of the model the effect is an 
increase between 1 percentage point and 12 percentage points on the probability of 
choosing a flexible job. The two stage least squares specification estimates the effect to 
be a fifty percentage point increase in choosing a flexible job. Because the endogeneity of 
a binary variable leads to non-classical errors alternative methods should be used. 
 In the next section I discuss the binary choice model. In section 3 I discuss the 
endogeneity issue and the difficulties that are associated with estimating the model. In 
section 4 I discuss several methods that deal with the endogeneity issue. In section 5 I 
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construct the sample used to analyze the results and in section 6 I compare the various 
results. And I finally conclude in section 7. 
3.2 BINARY CHOICE FRAMEWORK 
Let D be the observed binary dependent variable which in this case is flexible 
schedules, X be a vector of observed regressor including the treatment variable T, 
working spouse. T is also binary and an element of X. The binary choice model to be 
estimated is  
 ( ' 0),D I X      (3.1) 
where I is an indicator function which equals one if the expression is true and zero 
otherwise and ε is an error term.  
 Families jointly maximize utility where they simultaneously face the tradeoffs 
between women’s home production and higher family income and the flexibility in men’s 
jobs at the cost of higher wages. The probability that D equals one given X is E(D|X) 
when ignoring endogeneity; which is the probability that ' 0X   . When T is 
endogenous the probability that D=1 will depend on the conditional distribution of ε 
given X rather than the marginal distribution of ε but the marginal distribution is often 
used to measure the choice probability (Blundell and Powell 2004). 
3.3 ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM 
 It is reasonable to assume that married couples make joint labor market decisions 
regarding both the choice to work and the choice of flexibility in order to maximize 
family utility. Because these decisions are simultaneously determined the endogeneity 
must be accounted for in the model. 
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 If the endogeneity is unaccounted for the estimates could be biased. This occurs 
because the error terms are correlated with the regressors. Typically endogeneity is 
accounted for by using instrumental variables. For an instrument to be valid two 
conditions must be met: the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable 
conditional on the other control variables and it must be uncorrelated with the error term. 
However since the dependent variable is binary is the error terms will be remain 
correlated with the regressors and it remains difficult to obtained unbiased estimates of 
the endogenous variables. 
 In order to address the endogeneity when the dependent variable is binary 
alternative methods must be explored. 
3.4 METHODS 
In this section I discuss several methods that attempt to solve the endogeneity 
problem. I first will discuss the linear probability model. The LPM does not address the 
endogeneity issue but will serve as a baseline for comparison to the other models. I will 
also estimate traditional two stage models despite their shortcomings. I will finally 
consider alternative specifications that adequately deal with binary dependent variables 
and endogeneity. 
Econometricians disagree on the efficacy of proposed solutions in dealing with 
endogeneity of a limited dependent variable. I discuss several alternatives methods and 
how the methods deal with the endogeneity problem and also the complications that arise 
from the method. The complications may include restrictive assumptions or may create 
different econometric problems such as bias.  
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I also provide a baseline estimates using ordinary least squares and probit 
estimation. These methods ignore the endogeneity problem but are useful for comparing 
effects across regressions. 
A. Linear Probability Model 
 Consider the classical model 
 ,y x u   (3.2) 
where y is the dependent variable in this case flexible schedules, β is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated, x is a series of explanatory variables and u is the residual. For 
now assume that the residual is uncorrelated with the regressors; this allows me to 
estimate the parameters using OLS. This assumption will be relaxed and the endogeneity 
issue will addressed. 
 The expected value of y given x is the probability that individuals choose a 
flexible job 
 Pr( 1| ) ( | : ) .y x E y x x     (3.3) 
The probability that I observe a man in an inflexible job is 
 Pr( 0 | ) 1 ,y x x    (3.4) 
since the probabilities must sum to 1. 
 While the linear probability model can be easily estimated it is not without its 
shortcomings. By definition probabilities must fall between zero and one, but predicted 
probabilities can be greater than one or negative. Further consider that if a continuous 
covariate increases the probability of choosing a flexible job and because the model is 
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linear as this covariate continues to increase the probability of choosing a flexible job 
increases by more than one.  
 Another problem with the LPM is that residuals are not independent of the 
regressors. In particular, the residuals,   is equal to 1 – xβ or –xβ, and these are 
functions of the regressors. This does not satisfy the assumption of no correlation 
between the regressors and the error term as the conditional expected mean of the 
residuals must be zero. Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) among others show that OLS 
estimates of the LPM are both inconsistent and asymptotically biased. 
 Despite these shortcomings OLS remains a popular method to estimate binary 
choice models. I estimate the LPM to use as a baseline of comparison for other methods. 
B. Probit Model 
 The probit model addresses the shortcomings of the linear probability model. The 
probit model restricts predicted values to be between zero and one and because the model 
is nonlinear the partial effects will increase quickly when xβ=0 and decline to zero at 
large values of xβ.  
 The probit estimator can be derived from the binary choice frame above; however 
OLS must now be abandoned. The probit maximum likelihood estimator is  
 
1
ln ( | ; ) { ln ( ) (1 )ln[1 ( )]}.
N
i i i i
i
L y x y x y x  

      (3.5) 
Since there is endogeneity in the regressors the probit estimates will be biased. In order to 
account for this an instrument must be used. These methods will be discussed next in the 
next subsection. 
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C. Two Stage Least Squares 
When the regressors are correlated with the error terms the assumptions of the 
classical model are violated and the parameter estimators will be inconsistent if estimated 
by OLS. However employing an instrumental variable and estimating the model through 
two-stage least squares can remedy this problem. In order for an instrument to be valid it 
must meet two criteria, the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous regressor 
and uncorrelated with the residuals. 
I use state-year female labor force participation as an instrumental variable in the 
two stage model. As more women enter the workplace men are more likely feeling more 
pressure to be involved at home and share greater responsibility in home production. This 
measure is correlated with individual spouses to enter the labor force and can be thought 
to be predetermined when spouse make their decision to work or not. The individual 
decision to work or not as a negligible effect on the state’s labor force participation and 
can be considered exogenous. 
The estimates although not efficient are consistent and so this two-stage model is 
often the preferred method for this reason. However, the endogenous variable is binary a 




D. Bivariate Probit 
 The bivariate probit model, models both the decision to decision for the wife to 
work and the decision of a flexible job for the husband. The model allows for there to be 
                                                 
28
 If the model is specified incorrectly the estimates will be inconsistent (Angrist 2001).  
 
 88 
correlation be the decisions and for the errors to be correlated. This is an appealing 
feature of the model since it is likely that those decisions are made simultaneously by 
families. 




1 1 1 2 1
'








where y1 is the variable of interest, flexible work schedules, y2, here working spouse, 
enters endogenously in the first equation, x1 and x2 are vectors of control variables in each 
of the two regression equations and is estimated using maximum likelihood. The 
residuals are assumed to be independent, identically distributed following the bivariate 
standard normal distribution with correlation parameter ρ: 
 
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 222
1 1
( , , ) exp ( 2 ) .
2(1 )2 1
       
 
 
     
 (3.7) 
If the error terms are uncorrelated it is appropriate to estimate the equations in (3.5) 
separately. 
 The bivariate probit is similar to two stage least squares in which it corrects for 
the endogeneity of the regressor by regressing the endogenous variable on the control 
variables in the first stage and correcting for it in the second stage. However the model 
yields inconsistent estimates if the first stage regression is not specified correctly (Angrist 
2001).  
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E. Sample Correct Probit- Causal IV 
 The endogeneity problem is typically solved by using an instrumental variable in 
order to identify the causal effect of the endogenous treatment variable. In this section I 
discuss several methods that have used to address the endogeneity issue. Most of the 
methods fail to take into account the effects of an endogenous dummy variable and do 
not adequately address the identification issue. Angrist (2001) outlines the Causal IV 
method developed by Abadie (2000). 
 The methodology developed be Abadie and discussed by Angrist can be used to 
estimate nonlinear models with endogenous binary regressors without making 
distribution assumptions. A two-stage least squares model is estimated for the equation:  
 
' ,i i i iY X D      (3.8) 
where Yi is the outcome of interest, here observing person i in a flexible job, Xi is a vector 
of covariates including demographic controls, Di is the endogenous dummy variable and 
εi is a stochastic error term. But if the assumptions of additive and constant effect are 
invalid, the 2SLS estimates do not provide the best linear predictor (Angrist 2001). Since 
Di is binary it seems reasonable to estimate a non-linear model in the first stage such as 
logit or probit but the second-stage estimates will be inconsistent unless the first stage 
regression is specified correctly; using a linear probability model in the first stage will 
yield consistent estimates in second stage (Angrist 2001). However a LPM may yield 
negative probabilities or probabilities greater than one. 
 The Causal IV estimator provides the best linear predictor and is based on 
assumptions used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to estimate average treatment effects. 
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These assumptions are: independence of the instrument, exclusion of the instrument, the 
instrument is correlated with D in the first stage, and monotonicity. The first assumption 
can be interpreted to mean the instrument is “as good as randomly assigned.” Assumption 
2 imposes the condition that variation in the instrument does not change potential 
outcomes other than through D. Assumption 3 ensures that the instrument and 
endogenous regressor are correlated. Assumption 4 ignores the possibility of defiers in 
the data.  
 I provide an overview of the model, for technical details see Angrist (2001) and 
Abadie (2000). Estimate the effects on the endogenous variable, working spouse, of the 
control variables using probit. Predict the observed outcomes and calculate the weights κ 
that will be used in the second stage. The weights are 
 1 { (1 ) / (1 [ | ])} (1 ).i i i i i iD Z E Z X D        (3.9) 
Next estimate the effects of having a working spouse on the probability of a married 
working man choosing a flexible job using weighted least squares; some of the weights 
may be negative be construction. Angrist shows that the resulting estimates are consistent 
and can be used to identify the effects of endogenous regressors on a binary dependent 
variable. 
3.5 DATA 
Like in chapter 2, I use individual level data from the Current Population Survey: 
Work Supplement Survey.
29
 The data include information on demographic variables 
including age, marital status, and parent status, occupational data, and schedule flexibility 
                                                 
29
 The survey is available for the years 1985, 1991, 1997, 2001 and 2004.  
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data. I restrict the sample to married men age 25-65 working year round. Only married 
men are analyzed in the sample in order to estimate the role of working spouses on 
probability that men enter a flexible job. 
Summary statistics can be found in Table 3.1. Workers in jobs with schedule 
flexibility tend to be more educated and earn approximately $90 more per week than 
workers in jobs without schedule flexibility. Men in flexible jobs are also more likely to 
be married to women with college degrees relative to men in non-flexible jobs. 
The CPS interviews each member in the household making it possible to match 
husbands and wives to one another. The variable is of interest is an indicator variable for 
wife’s working status.  The percentage of working wives in the sample has increase from 
41 percent in 1985 to 47 percent in 1997 before falling to 38 percent in 2004. This is 
displayed along with the percent of men in flexible jobs in Figure 3.1. The percentage of 
working wives decreased while the percentage of men in flexible jobs increased from 14 
percent in 1985 to 39 percent in 1997 where it has since leveled off. 
3.6 RESULTS 
I estimate the various model and individually discuss the implications of each 
model. In order to compare results across models the marginal effect must be calculated 
for each of the models. 
A. Regression Results 
I first estimate two baseline models, a linear probability model and probit model, 
in which assumes there is no endogeneity. The linear probability model is estimated using 
ordinary least squares. The results for both regressions can be found it Table 3.2. In both 
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the LPM and probit there is positive correlation between men employed in jobs with 
schedule flexibility and working spouses.  
The interpretation of the linear probability model is straightforward. On average, 
having a working spouse increases the probability of choosing a job with schedule 
flexibility by 1.5 percentage points. However the probit regression cannot be interpreted 
in this way, it can only be said that working spouses are positively correlated with men 
choose job with schedule flexibility.  
The linear probability model and probit model are frequently used to estimate the 
effects on a binary outcome variable but they do not take into account endogeneity of the 
simultaneous decision and other methods should be used. Two stage least squares takes 
into account endogeneity. The estimated regression results can be found in Table 3.3. In 
the first stage I estimate the likelihood that a working spouse in present in the household. 
I use state-year female labor force participation rates as an instrumental variable. 
Working spouses is positively associated with college graduates, age, and female labor 
force participation.  
In the second stage this information is used to correct for the correlation between 
working spouses and flexible schedules. Having a working spouse increases the 
probability of choosing a job with a flexible schedule by 54 percentage points. Schedule 
flexibility is a limited dependent variable and can only take the values zero and one. This 
causes the estimated residuals to not be independent with the dependent variable. 
Specifically, they take the values x  and 1 x . This leads to biased estimates and the 
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effect of working spouses on the probability of choosing jobs with schedule flexibility 
maybe overstated.  
In Table 3.4 I report the estimates of the bivariate probit model. The bivariate 
probit model is the non-linear equivalent of the two stage least squares model. In the first 
stage the decision to have a working spouse is estimated using a probit model. Working 
spouses are positively associated with state-year female labor force participation and 
college graduates. These results are then taken into account in the second stage and state-
year specific female labor force participation is once again used as the excluded variable 
in the second stage. 
In the second stage a probit model is used to estimate the likelihood men choose a 
job with scheduling flexibility. Men choosing a job with schedule flexibility are once 
again positively correlated working spouses. Jobs with schedule flexibility are more 
likely to be chosen when individuals are college graduates, are older, and when there is a 
more highly educated work force. Marginal effects must be calculated in order to 
compare the model to the baseline linear probability model. 
Lastly, in Table 3.5 I report the results from the causal instrumental variable 
approach. The causal IV method is variation of two stage least squares where specific 
weights are calculated from the first stage probit regression and utilized in the second 
stage. Once again the instrument used is state-year specific female labor force 
participation. In the first stage working spouses are positively correlated with state-year 
specific labor force participation.  
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In the second stage having a working spouse decreases the probability of choosing 
a job with schedule flexibility by .7 percentage points. However the null hypothesis that 
this is significantly different zero cannot be rejected. Choosing a job with schedule 
flexibility is more likely when individuals are college graduates and when workers are 
older.  
B. Marginal Effects 
In order to compare the results across models the marginal effects must be 
calculated. These effects are reported in Table 3.6. The OLS results are found in column 
1 and provide a baseline of comparison to the other methods. Under this specification 
working married man is 1.5 percentage points more likely to choose a flexible job if their 
spouse is working. 
 Other characteristics have the expected effect on the probability that working men 
choose a flexible job. Being a college graduate increases the probability of choosing a 
flexible job by 15 percentage points and a 5 year increase in age leads to a 1 percentage 
point increase. Age roughly correlates to experience and experience leads to more 
flexible jobs. However, the higher percentage of women whom are college graduates an 
11.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing a flexible job.  As more 
individuals complete college it is more difficult to obtain a job with desirable attributes. 
 The probit model is column 2 has similarly sized effects of the flexible jobs. The 
notable difference between the two models is that the effect of female college graduates 
is positive but statistically insignificant from zero.  
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 The two-stage least squares predict the largest effect of a working spouse on 
choosing a flexible job. The effect of having a working spouse increases the probability 
of choosing a flexible job by 54 percentage points. This effect is over four times larger 
than the next largest effect from the bivariate probit model. Because the errors are 
correlated with the regressors the will yield biased estimates (Lewbel, Dong, and Yang 
2012). The effect of being a college graduate on choosing a flexible job is in line with the 
other models. However the effect of age is now negative and a 10 year increase in age 
leads to a one percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing a flexible job for 
working men. 
 The bivariate probit (column 4) is similar to the two-stage least squares model 
discussed above. In the first stage the probability of having a working spouse is estimated 
using the female labor force participation rate by state and year as an instrument. Both the 
first and second stage regressions are nonlinear. Having a working spouse increases the 
probability of selecting a flexible job by six percentage points. The effect of being a 
college graduate is smaller than the other models and increases the probability of 
choosing a job with scheduling flexibility by three percentage points.   
Finally in column 5 are the results of the causal IV are displayed. The effect of 
working spouses on men choosing flexible jobs is negative (less than one percentage 
point change) and statistically insignificant. The effect is roughly half the size in 
magnitude compared to the baseline models. The effect of college graduates increases the 
probability of choosing a flexible job by 17 percentage points. The effect of female 
college graduates is positive but statistically insignificant.   
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3.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 The effects of working spouse on the probability of choosing a flexible job for 
married working men range from a decrease in the probability of 1 percentage point to an 
increase of over 50 percentage points. These estimates form an upper and lower bound of 
the effect on flexible jobs. My preferred specification is the Causal IV as it corrects for 
the endogeneity of working spouse and provides consistent estimates. However this 
model estimates the effect of working spouse to be in opposite direction of the expected 
sign and the remaining specifications. However this effect cannot be not be distinguished 
from zero. The true effect of a working spouse on the probability of choosing a flexible 
job may actually be positive as suggested by the remaining specifications.  
 On an intuitive level it makes sense that men with working spouses would be 
more likely to choose jobs with flexible schedules. Families may wish to be able to 
coordinate their schedules in order to better balance their work and personal lives. It also 
provides an opportunity for individuals to take off from work if something unexpected 
arises. Family structure is an important determinant in the occupational choice model and 
how individuals value flexible schedules. These results are consistent with the results 
from this paper which show that individuals’ whose spouse works has a greater need for 
flexible schedules. I find in the occupational choice model that married men value 
flexibility in greater amounts. Married men whose spouses are working are more likely to 




Table 3.1: Sample Means    
  
Full 
Sample Flex Non-Flex 
Schedule Flexibility 0.164 
 
  
  (0.370) 
 
  
Working Spouse 0.274 0.289 0.271 
  (0.446) (0.454) (0.444) 
Wife College Grad. 0.147 0.197 0.138 
  (0.355) (0.398) (0.345) 
College Grad. 0.392 0.523 0.366 
  (0.488) (0.500) (0.482) 
Age 40.355 40.278 40.370 
  (10.461) (10.214) (10.509) 
Weekly Earnings 545.273 619.375 530.762 
  (307.023) (367.352) (291.582) 
Hours Worked per 
Week 41.740 41.610 41.765 
  (8.014) (9.500) (7.689) 
Married 0.709 0.683 0.714 
  (0.454) (0.466) (0.452) 
Parent 0.537 0.537 0.537 
  (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) 
Year 1992.108 1993.003 1991.933 
  (6.854) (6.963) (6.819) 
Num. Obs. 15126 2477 12649 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Regressions 
The dependent variable is the binary outcome, jobs with schedule flexibility. 
  OLS Probit 
Working Spouse 0.015 0.042 
  (0.003) (0.009) 
Pct. Women College Grads -0.115 0.134 
  (0.048) (0.161) 
College Graduate 0.153 0.480 
  (0.003) (0.008) 
Age 0.002 0.005 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
1985 -0.024   







1997 0.205 0.894 
  (0.017) (0.043) 
2001 0.201 0.883 
  (0.017) (0.043) 
2004 0.196 0.868 
  (0.017) (0.043) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 





Table 3.3: Two Stage Least Squares 
First Stage Regression: Dependent variable 
Working Spouse, IV State Year Female LFP 
College Graduate 0.037 
  (0.003) 
Age 0.004 
  (0.000) 
Pct. Women College Grads 0.133 
  (0.048) 
State Year Female LFP 0.638 
  (0.065) 
1991 0.722 
  (0.028) 
1997 0.765 
  (0.028) 
2001 0.658 
  (0.028) 
2004 0.664 
  (0.028) 
    
Second Stage Regression: Dependent Variable 
Schedule Flexibility 
Working Spouse 0.544 
  (0.115) 
College Graduate 0.133 
  (0.005) 
Age -0.001 
  (0.000) 
Pct. Women College Grads -0.197 
  (0.057) 
1991 -0.217 
  (0.053) 
1997 -0.047 
  (0.061) 
2001 0.004 
  (0.050) 
2004 -0.003 
  (0.050) 




Table 3.4: Bivariate Probit 
First Stage: Working Spouse 
State Year Female LFP 2.154 
  (0.100) 
1985 -0.965 
  (0.328) 
1991 0.269 
  (0.012) 
1997 0.267 
  (0.012) 
2004 0.029 
  (0.012) 
College Graduate 0.101 
  (0.009) 
Constant -1.613 
  (0.060) 
Second Stage: Flexible Schedule 
Working Spouse 0.698 
  (0.126) 
Pct. Female College Grads. By State 0.124 
  (0.156) 
College Graduate 0.436 
  (0.016) 
Age 0.005 
  (0.000) 
1991 -0.200 
  (0.044) 
1997 0.579 
  (0.071) 
2001 0.637 
  (0.061) 
2004 0.616 
  (0.061) 
Constant -1.390 
  (0.096) 
State Fixed Effects Yes 
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Table 3.5: Causal IV 
First Stage Probit: Probability of Working Spouse 
State Year Female LFP 1.071 
  (0.927) 
Log Real Weekly Wages -0.014 
  (0.019) 
College Graduate 0.069 
  (0.025) 
1991 0.355 
  (0.038) 
1997 0.223 
  (0.063) 
2001 0.124 
  (0.035) 
2004 0.065 
  (0.028) 
State Year Fixed Effects Yes 
    
Second Stage Weighted Least Squares:  
Working Spouse -0.007 
  (0.008) 
Pct. Female College Grads. By State 0.083 
  (0.162) 
College Graduate 0.171 
  (0.008) 
Age 0.000 
  (0.000) 
1991 -0.148 
  (0.060) 
1997 -0.059 
  (0.016) 
2001 0.075 
  (0.021) 
2004 0.048 
  (0.021) 




Table 3.6: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Men Choosing Flexible Jobs 





Working Spouse 0.015 0.014 0.544 0.063 -0.007 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.115) (0.011) (0.008) 
Pct. Female College Grad. By State and Year -0.115 0.044 -0.197 0.006 0.083 
  (0.048) (0.053) (0.057) (0.007) (0.162) 
College Graduate 0.153 0.163 0.133 0.030 0.171 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) 
Age 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












































In order to obtain a large sample of individuals I use the 1980-2000 Census data. 
While this sample provides a number of benefits, including precise estimates and the 
ability to use a large number of occupations it also creates difficulties in creating the data. 
Here I will describe in detail how I constructed the data. I first generate dummy variables 
for each of the demographic groups in the Census data. I then collapse the data by 
occupation-year to create count data of the number of individuals in each demographic 
group whom choose a particular occupation
30
. By doing this I am able to take advantage 
of the Poisson log likelihood function. 
I then merge in working conditions from the Occupational Information Network 
(O*Net). O*Net uses the standard occupational classification system (SOC) which I am 
able to convert into occ1990 codes using a crosswalk available from IPUMS. SOC and 
occ1990 do not match one-to-one; several SOC codes will match into a single occ1990 
code. This is problematic since each of the SOC occupations have different working 
conditions from O*Net. In order to obtain accurate estimates of the working conditions 
for each occupation a weighted average is needed
31
. To obtain the weights I download the 
2001-2009 American Community Survey (ACS) and find the average proportion of 
people in each SOC that matches into a particular occ1990. Consider a simple example in 
                                                 
30
 I use the Census variable occ1990 to define the occupations since it is consistently used between the 3 
Census years.  
31
 Of the 205 occupations in the Census that there is O*Net data available there are 153 unique matches 
between the SOC and occ1990 codes. For the remaining occupations I approximate the weights to use. 
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which 2 SOC codes match into a single occ1990 code. Suppose, the data in Table A4 is 
observed from the ACS, I first find the weights for each year. In 2001 SOC occupation 1 
would have a weight equal to 0.4 (10/25) and SOC occupation 2 would have a weight 
equal to 0.6 (15/25). But in 2002 the weights change to 0.3 and 0.7 for occupations 1 and 
2. I next average these weights over time to account for any extreme observations. The 
final weights become 0.35 and 0.65 for occupations 1 and 2. 
These weights are then merged into the Census data and weighted averages of 
each O*Net characteristic is taken for each occ1990 occupation. Lastly, I merge in the 
auxiliary measures of flexibility from the Current Population Survey Work Schedule 
Supplement. The CPS follows the Census in their occupation classification scheme and 











   1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Flexible Work 
Hours 0.326 0.480 0.409 0.281 0.368 0.407 
  (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) 
Exposure to Safe 
Conditions 0.928 0.801 0.967 0.703 0.684 0.642 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
On the Job 
Training 
Required 0.252 0.242 0.133 0.360 0.028 0.077 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unstructured Job 0.580 0.512 0.659 1.144 0.724 0.593 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Assisting or 
Caring for Others -0.027 -0.043 -0.125 -0.160 -0.244 -0.319 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Level of 
Competition -0.003 0.429 0.294 0.596 0.718 0.760 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 4.987 4.388 4.869 1.805 3.648 4.085 
  (0.057) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) 
Log Likelihood -32290 -56899 -63834 -118964 -106453 -103250 

































Work Hours 0.364 0.496 0.150 0.419 0.532 0.498 0.252 0.246 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.053) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.094) (0.016) 
Exposure to 
Safe 
Conditions 1.037 0.976 0.841 0.929 0.597 0.662 0.461 0.678 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.037) (0.007) 
On the Job 
Training 
Required 0.170 0.122 0.135 0.115 0.153 0.066 0.071 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.035) (0.006) 
Unstructured 
Job 0.640 0.745 0.495 0.636 0.784 0.614 0.395 0.436 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.041) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.074) (0.012) 
Assisting or 
Caring for 
Others -0.074 -0.160 -0.076 -0.147 -0.252 -0.348 -0.285 -0.371 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.029) (0.005) 
Level of 
Competition 0.222 0.383 0.163 0.303 0.773 0.801 0.722 0.730 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.053) (0.009) 
Constant 3.859 2.990 2.721 4.029 1.871 2.491 0.189 4.207 
  (0.072) (0.077) (0.167) (0.061) (0.057) (0.068) (0.295) (0.050) 
Log 
Likelihood -19863 -18052 -3407 -25524 -40355 -26417 -1299 -38349 




Table A3a: Occupational Choice Regressions by Demographic Group 
    Females     Males   
Married Kids 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Flexible Work 
Hours 
0.340 0.511 0.364 0.239 0.206 0.532 
  (0.052) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) 
Exposure to Safe 
Conditions 
1.003 0.856 1.037 0.688 0.648 0.597 
  (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
On the Job 
Training Required 
0.227 0.275 0.170 0.438 0.098 0.153 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unstructured Job 0.520 0.454 0.640 1.419 1.016 0.784 
  (0.029) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Assisting or 
Caring for Others 
0.039 0.058 -0.074 -0.108 -0.170 -0.252 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Level of 
Competition 
-0.265 0.257 0.222 0.601 0.685 0.773 
  (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 4.395 3.582 3.859 -0.323 1.399 1.871 
  (0.120) (0.078) (0.072) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) 
Log Likelihood -7741 -16330 -19863 -60739 -48314 -40355 




Table A3b: Occupational Choice Regressions by Demographic Group 
 
  Females     Males   
Married No Kids 




0.359 0.500 0.496 0.290 0.445 0.498 
  (0.042) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.023) (0.020) 
Exposure to Safe 
Conditions 
0.918 0.793 0.976 0.733 0.707 0.662 
  (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
On the Job 
Training Required 
0.249 0.241 0.122 0.335 0.002 0.066 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Unstructured Job 0.693 0.634 0.745 1.118 0.719 0.614 
  (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Assisting or 
Caring for Others 
-0.058 -0.104 -0.160 -0.189 -0.283 -0.348 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Level of 
Competition 
0.030 0.525 0.383 0.665 0.799 0.801 
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Constant 3.310 2.501 2.990 0.378 2.089 2.491 
  (0.106) (0.079) (0.077) (0.075) (0.069) (0.068) 
Log Likelihood -10177 -17823 -18052 -28229 -26065 -26417 




Table A3c: Occupational Choice Regressions by Demographic Group 
    Females     Males   
Single Kids 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Flexible Work 
Hours 
0.299 0.212 0.150 0.186 -0.012 0.252 
  (0.111) (0.069) (0.053) (0.219) (0.136) (0.094) 
Exposure to Safe 
Conditions 
0.897 0.653 0.841 0.560 0.504 0.461 
  (0.046) (0.033) (0.030) (0.053) (0.043) (0.037) 
On the Job 
Training Required 
0.259 0.276 0.135 0.282 0.125 0.071 
  (0.037) (0.031) (0.021) (0.055) (0.047) (0.035) 
Unstructured Job 0.378 0.417 0.495 0.870 0.553 0.395 
  (0.064) (0.050) (0.041) (0.108) (0.097) (0.074) 
Assisting or 
Caring for Others 
-0.054 0.016 -0.076 -0.234 -0.270 -0.285 
  (0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.042) (0.038) (0.029) 
Level of 
Competition 
0.051 0.261 0.163 0.664 0.698 0.722 
  (0.043) (0.034) (0.027) (0.077) (0.070) (0.053) 
Constant 2.548 1.662 2.721 -2.430 -0.793 0.189 
  (0.265) (0.206) (0.167) (0.457) (0.392) (0.295) 
Log Likelihood -1752 -2401 -3407 -874 -897 -1299 




Table A3d: Occupational Choice Regressions by Demographic Group 
    Females     Males   
Single No Kids 




0.286 0.466 0.419 0.347 0.494 0.246 
  (0.036) (0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.018) (0.016) 
Exposure to Safe 
Conditions 
0.897 0.780 0.929 0.710 0.714 0.678 
  (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
On the Job 
Training Required 
0.260 0.213 0.115 0.266 -0.041 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Unstructured Job 0.555 0.478 0.636 0.816 0.454 0.436 
  (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
Assisting or 
Caring for Others 
-0.042 -0.081 -0.147 -0.220 -0.309 -0.371 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Level of 
Competition 
0.106 0.494 0.303 0.530 0.705 0.730 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 3.927 3.527 4.029 2.371 3.976 4.207 
  (0.087) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.052) (0.050) 
Log Likelihood -14472 -23014 -25524 -31994 -34117 -38349 
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